Pandemic Pluralism: Legislator Championing of Organized Interests in Response to COVID-19

The Unequal Effects of the COVID-19 Pandemic on Political Interest Representation

“…Moreover, for social media activity, NGOs increase their activities relative to business interests both among low-resource and high-resource interest groups. This finding complements recent work by Furnas et al ( 2021 ) showing that money is not a key factor determining attention by Members of Congress to interest group concerns during COVID-19. They find only a weak association between campaign donations of a sector and subsequent mentioning of the sector in press releases by these members (Furnas et al, 2021 ).…”

“…Inequalities in interest representation have long worried political observers and academics, and have frequently been viewed as a persistent feature of policy-making, both across political systems and across time (Rasmussen & Reher, Forthcoming). The COVID-19 pandemic provides a unique opportunity to shed light on whether large-scale shocks to the political agenda can magnify or reduce these inequalities due to its pan-societal nature and its effects on a broad set of different interests (Furnas et al, 2021 ).…”

“…From the literature, we know that crises can lead to dramatic and radical shifts of political agendas. We know less, however, about how they affect interest representation in general (Birkland, 1998 ; Furnas et al, 2021 ) and inequalities in interest group access in particular. An important recent exception is Junk et al ( 2021 ), which investigates the drivers behind how groups perceive changes in their political access as a result of the pandemic.…”

“…While some specific economic sectors might be more affected by the pandemic than others, the pan-societal nature of COVID-19 makes it difficult to establish a priori that either business interests or NGOs as a whole should be more disturbed and incentivized to mobilize. According to a recent study by Furnas et al ( 2021 ), “in effect, the pandemic acts as a shock disrupting virtually every sector, thus putting each in plausible need of legislative ’champions”’ (Furnas et al, 2021 , p. 24). Moreover, while disturbances might act as a demand mechanism that stimulates interest groups to mobilize, the relative prominence of different types of groups also depends on whether policy-makers supply them with access.…”

Either with Us or Against Us: Business Power and Campaign Contributions in an Age of Hyper-Partisanship

“…Canes-Wrone and Miller (2022) find that House members’ votes are consistent with the preferences of the party’s national donor base. Furnas et al (2021) demonstrate that this general pattern also holds at a more granular level. In their analysis of congressional press releases issued during the onset of the COVID pandemic, they discovered that members of Congress were more likely to mention industries that were important party donors than those from which the member personally received funds.…”