Paradoxical impact of asymmetric regulation in Taiwan's telecommunications industry: Restriction and rent seeking

Chou, Yuntsai; Liu, Kung-Chung

doi:10.1016/j.telpol.2005.06.016

Cited by 15 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 3 publications

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“…Kruger (1974) first proposes and defines the notion of rent‐seeking, and believes that government intervention would lead to the emergence of rent‐seeking in the market. Subsequently, considering the rent‐seeking behavior between government and industry, Chou and Liu (2006) investigate the rent‐seeking relationship in the regulatory process of Taiwan's communications industry. Liu et al (2018) explore the effect of rent‐seeking behavior on corporate earnings management based on panel data.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

The governance of rent‐seeking behavior in carbon asset pledge financing: An evolutionary game perspective

Chen

Ding

2023

Manage Decis Econ

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As an emerging financing model in the carbon financial market, carbon asset pledge financing (CAPF) has received extensive attention from governments and firms with the advance of low‐carbon economy. Since enterprises, banks, third‐party carbon asset evaluation agencies (TCAs), governments, etc, are involved in the operation of CAPF, driven by information asymmetry and the interaction among different stakeholders, rent‐seeking behavior is easy to occur in CAPF. This paper develops an evolutionary game model to investigate the rent‐seeking behavior in CAPF among different stakeholders. In addition, the risk‐sharing and penalty mechanisms are also taken into account. Subsequently, we examine the effect of relevant parameters on the dynamic evolution strategy of all parties in CAPF rent‐seeking through numerical examples. The results show that the governance of rent‐seeking behavior in CAPF needs the cooperation of different participating entities, the improvement of carbon financial market can reduce the occurrence of rent‐seeking behavior in CAPF. Compared with firms, TCAs are more susceptible to opportunism. Additionally, both the risk‐sharing mechanism and the penalty mechanism can effectively reduce the occurrence of rent‐seeking behavior. This paper contributes to the management of CAPF, and managerial insights for the governance of rent‐seeking behavior in CAPF are also provided.

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Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

The governance of rent‐seeking behavior in carbon asset pledge financing: An evolutionary game perspective

Chen

Ding

2023

Manage Decis Econ

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“…The only papers using data examining the implementation of asymmetric regulation are Dewenter and Haucap (2005) and Chou and Liu (2006). Dewenter and Haucap (2005) examines mobile termination fees in Europe, and find that asymmetric regulation of the largest operator induces smaller operators to increase their termination rates.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Dewenter and Haucap (2005) examines mobile termination fees in Europe, and find that asymmetric regulation of the largest operator induces smaller operators to increase their termination rates. Chou and Liu (2006) use Taiwan's experience with asymmetric regulation to analyze how asymmetric regulation affects. The authors find that asymmetric regulation increases the number of competitors as well as penetration rates.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The effect of asymmetric regulation on market competition: the case of the 2013 Telecomm Reform in Mexico

Silva,

Pastrana

2023

Preprint

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We examine the economic effects of the 2013 Telecommunications Reform in Mexico that implemented asymmetric regulation on the largest telecommunications operator in the country. This regulation imposed on the “preponderant” telecommunications operator, defined as the operator with more than 50% of the connections of all the sector, a series of requirements aimed to increase market competition and facilitate entry in the sector. We investigate the effects of this regulation on market competition using quarterly data from the Mexican telecommunications operators in the period 2010.3-2017.3. Results provide evidence that the asymmetric regulations fostered competition in two ways: they fostered entry into the sector, which resulted in a decrease of the market share of the preponderant agent, driven by a decrease in the market share of prepaid lines; and at the same time intensified competition by increasing the quality of the services provided by the preponderant agent, which resulted in a net gain in the number of lines transferred to this agent, and an increase in the number of postpaid lines.

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“…As communication expanded to include a fixed or mobile number in another town, state, or country, mobile providers partnered with landline companies using their physical infrastructure to transport long-distance communication ( The mobile network has continued to improve as mobile service providers have expanded their underground interconnectivity infrastructure (Chou & Liu, 2006). By implementing these changes, mobile providers have gained total autonomy in most communications and interconnectivities, with the exception of a few access points that continue to use shared partnership through rental of a satellite band or fiber optic connection for sporadic use by the mobile provider.…”

Section: Long-distance Mobile Communicationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Regulation Misunderstanding: Convergence Complexity Providing Failures in Telecommunication Services Costs

Arruda Filho

2017

JISTEM USP

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This manuscript discusses a theoretical competitive scenario for telecommunications services, in particular voice over Internet protocol (VoIP), and finds that the economic benefits of the current technological convergence are based on three main factors: technological advances and updates; regulation failures related to technological complexity; and consumer inability to exploit the benefits of convergence. This study begins by giving the background to voice communication in the telecommunications sector and the misunderstanding of the competitive boundaries between technologies, service providers, and usage applications generated in an unregulated sector. Second, the kinds of regulation that organizes the development and pricing of integrated or bundled services are briefly discussed and presented. Third, theoretical analysis of the competitive environment is interpreted in terms of the three factors: technological advances, regulation failure, and consumer knowledge of convergence. Results derived from these factors are presented in the context of VoIP services. Finally, the work concludes by outlining the implications for regulatory reform and the impact on competitive behavior, and describes possibilities for the future management of the technology sector.

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Paradoxical impact of asymmetric regulation in Taiwan's telecommunications industry: Restriction and rent seeking

Cited by 15 publications

References 3 publications

The governance of rent‐seeking behavior in carbon asset pledge financing: An evolutionary game perspective

The governance of rent‐seeking behavior in carbon asset pledge financing: An evolutionary game perspective

The effect of asymmetric regulation on market competition: the case of the 2013 Telecomm Reform in Mexico

Regulation Misunderstanding: Convergence Complexity Providing Failures in Telecommunication Services Costs

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