Paranormal beliefs and individual differences: story seeking without reasoned review

Abstract

In a sample of 599 participants (60% female, 18-81 years), we tested the hypotheses that cognitive ability and the big-six personality traits suffice to explain the individual-difference component of paranormal beliefs (belief in magic, astrology, esoterism, supernatural beings, and spirituality). Additionally, we measured 14 other potential predictors that were found to correlate with paranormal beliefs in prior research (e.g., ontological confusion). Although cognitive ability and the big-six explained 10% of the variance in individual belief, ontological confusion and causality understanding also were significant predictors in regression analyses. The resulting model, explaining 19 % of variance, consists of ontological confusion, cognitive ability (negative correlation), openness to new experiences, emotionality, conscientiousness (neg. corr.) and causality understanding (neg. corr.). We discuss the findings with reference to two hypothetical factors that drive individuals' acceptance of paranormal beliefs, inclination for story-telling, and tendency to evaluate belief content in terms of reason and conscientious evaluation.

The Effect of Analytic Cognitive Style on Credulity

“…The decision to examine the effect of negative emotionality on credulity was based on two lines of research. First, it has been shown that negative emotionality or neuroticism increased the paranormal beliefs ( Wiseman and Watt, 2004 ; Mikloušić et al, 2012 ; Lobato et al, 2014 ; Betsch et al, 2020 ) and also that believers are more neurotics than skeptics ( Lindeman and Aarnio, 2007 ). Second, negative emotionality (emotional instability and neuroticism) affects information processing and thus credulity—neuroticism seemed to be a negative predictor of rational processing style ( Pacini and Epstein, 1999 ).…”

On the Adaptive Value of Paranormal Beliefs - a Qualitative Study

“…The table contains subcategories of the third category (utility of belief) with quotations of representative examples resulting from suboptimal thinking (Atran 2002;Guthrie 1993;Haselton and Buss 2000). In line with this interpretation, there is evidence showing that believers in the paranormal tend to avoid analytic styles of thinking (e.g., Aarnio and Lindeman 2005;Gray and Gallo 2016), confuse ontological categories (e.g., animate and inanimate, Lindeman et al 2015; see also Betsch et al 2020), and have problems with formal reasoning (e.g., Betsch et al 2020;Musch and Ehrenberg 2002;Rogers et al 2009). From such a point of view, however, one is inclined to neglect the other side of these beliefs.…”

“…As such, belief in the paranormal is somewhat like a syndrome. Those people inclined to believe in, say, astrology or spiritual practices are also "open" to many other things that are in opposition to empirical facts (see Betsch et al 2020, for a discussion). A huge body of psychological research deals with individual differences as potential predictors for paranormal beliefs.…”

Acceptance and adherence to COVID-19 preventive measures are shaped predominantly by conspiracy beliefs, mistrust in science and fear - A comparison of more than 20 psychological variables

“…In a recent integrative theoretical framework, Rizeq et al (2021) suggested to consider conspiracy and paranormal beliefs and anti-science attitudes as three components of a higher order psychological factor termed as "contaminated mindware". According to this approach, specific cognitive processing styles result in a contaminated mindware, such as a biased perception of probability and causality (e.g., perceiving meaningful patterns or causality in unrelated events), low levels of reality testing and open-minded thinking (e.g., low ability or motivation to critically test the plausibility of one's beliefs), ontological confusions (e.g., believing that lifeless natural objects are animate or that thoughts can be manifested as physical forces), and related to all these aspects, an over-reliance on intuitiveexperiential over rational processing in judgments and decision making (e.g., Betsch et al, 2020;Blackmore & Moore, 1994;Blanco et al, 2015;Brugger & Graves, 1997;Čavojová et al, 2020;Denovan et al, 2018Denovan et al, , 2020Drinkwater et al, 2012;Foster & Kokko, 2009;Irwin, 2009;Leonard & Williams, 2019;Lindeman & Aarnio, 2007;Matute et al, 2011;Musch & Ehrenberg, 2002;Pennycook et al, 2012;Rizeq et al, 2021;Ståhl & van Prooijen, 2018;van Prooijen, Douglas, et al, 2018). Once unwarranted beliefs are established, counterfactual evidence is often ignored or integrated into the prior beliefs (Aaronovitch, 2010;Boudry & Braeckman, 2012;Irwin, 2004;Stanovich et al, 2013;Sutton & Douglas, 2014).…”