Parental expectations and school enrolment decisions: Evidence from rural Ghana

Ahiakpor, Ferdinand; Swaray, Raymond

doi:10.1111/rode.12122

Cited by 13 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 23 publications

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“…In particular, when one spouse has complete bargaining power, it is better for the child that it is the most patient spouse. This finding is in line with previous studies; Ahiakpor and Swaray (2015) find a positive association between male household heads’ patience and investments in children's education in rural Ghana. Tanaka and Yamano (2015) also find that the more patient the household head is, the higher are the educational expenditures in Uganda.…”

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 93%

Household Bargaining and Spending on Children: Experimental Evidence from Tanzania

Ringdal

Sjursen

2020

Economica

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This paper studies whether an increase in women's intrahousehold bargaining power causes couples to allocate more resources to their child's education, and, if so, what the underlying mechanisms for this might be. We conduct a between‐subject lab experiment with couples and vary the relative bargaining power between spouses. The paper provides two main insights. First, increasing the wife's bargaining power improves gender equality in allocation to children's education. However, it does not increase the amount invested in the child's education. Second, we show that the difference in time preferences between spouses matters for how much the household invests in the child's education. It benefits the child that the most patient spouse has more relative bargaining power. This implies that increasing the wife's bargaining power may reduce the allocation to the child's education if she is the less patient spouse. The results provide new insights into the current debate on female empowerment, and highlight the importance of incorporating a broader set of preferences in the analysis of intrahousehold decision‐making.

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Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 93%

Household Bargaining and Spending on Children: Experimental Evidence from Tanzania

Ringdal

Sjursen

2020

Economica

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“…In particular, when one spouse has complete bargaining power, it is most beneficial for the child if this is the most patient spouse. This finding is in line with previous studies; Ahiakpor and Swaray (2015) find a positive association between male household head's patience and investments in children's education in rural Ghana, and Tanaka and Yamano (2015) find that the more patient spouses are, the higher the educational expenditures are in Uganda. In our sample, men tend to be more patient than women, implying that, on average, it is more beneficial for the child if the husband is the main decision-maker.…”

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 92%

Household bargaining and spending on children: Experimental evidence from Tanzania

Ringdal¹,

Sjursen²

2017

WIDER Working Paper

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This paper studies whether increasing the wife's bargaining power results in couples allocating more resources to their child, and, if so, what the underlying mechanisms for this are. We conduct a novel between-subject lab experiment in Tanzania, in which we vary the relative bargaining power between spouses. The paper provides two main insights. First, increasing the wife's bargaining power does not result in an increase in the allocation to the child, but it does lead to equal allocations to boys and girls. Second, time preferences are important; it is more beneficial for the child that the most patient spouse has most bargaining power.

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“…25 In particular, when one spouse has complete bargaining power, it is better for the child that it is the most patient spouse. This finding is in line with previous studies; Ahiakpor and Swaray (2015) find a positive association between male household head's patience and investments in children's education in rural Ghana. Tanaka and Yamano (2015) also find that the more patient the household head is, the higher are the educational expenditures in Uganda.…”

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 93%

Household Bargaining and Spending on Children: Experimental Evidence from Tanzania.

Ringdal

Sjursen

2017

SSRN Journal

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It is frequently assumed that money in the hands of women leads to better outcomes for their children than money in the hands of men. However, empirical and theoretical evidence are mixed. We conduct a novel between-subject lab-in-the-field experiment to study whether increasing the wife's control over resources causes a couple to allocate more to their child. The paper provides two main insights. First, increasing the wife's bargaining power does not increase the share allocated to the child, but leads to more gender-equal allocations to children. Second, time preferences are important in explaining household decision-making; it is better for the child that the most patient spouse has more relative bargaining power. Our results highlight the importance of taking a broader set of preferences into account when studying household decision-making, and suggest that policy aimed to increase spending on children should target the spouse with preferences most aligned with such spending.

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Parental expectations and school enrolment decisions: Evidence from rural Ghana

Cited by 13 publications

References 23 publications

Household Bargaining and Spending on Children: Experimental Evidence from Tanzania

Household Bargaining and Spending on Children: Experimental Evidence from Tanzania

Household bargaining and spending on children: Experimental evidence from Tanzania

Household Bargaining and Spending on Children: Experimental Evidence from Tanzania.

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