Pareto Optimality and the Political Economy of Liberalism

Peacock, Alan T.; Rowley, Charles K.

doi:10.1086/259900

Cited by 28 publications

(11 citation statements)

References 2 publications

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“…In sum, bidding parity is generally absent at the renewal interval as all the advantages inherent to the party awarded the initial the long‐term contract. Consequently, incumbents are able to achieve the most favorable terms (Peacock & Rowley, 1972, p. 242; Schmalensee, 1979; Williamson, 1975). Competition therefore has been tied to the efficacy of these agreements both at the initial award and at the renewal interval (Demsetz, 1968; Williamson, 1976).…”

Section: Franchising and Long‐term Contracts As Mechanisms For Publicmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Effects of Competition‐Based Public Policy on Contractual Arrangements

Malatesta

Smith

2011

Policy Studies Journal

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When competition is naturally limited, policymakers craft regulation to obtain effects similar to those that would have occurred in the presence of competition. In many instances, regulation of this type is not successful in overcoming market failures. We rely on property rights theory and transaction cost theory to predict when state‐level policy statements will actually lead to a redistribution of benefits at the city level. We test this theory in the context of cable television franchise renewal agreements—a setting historically resistant to competition. We look to the language of the franchise agreements for evidence of concessions made by the cable operator to the city, and using a difference‐in‐difference estimator, we find that pro‐competitive regulation translates into concessions to the city. However, a credible threat of competition embedded in regulation is not enough to curb opportunism associated with monopoly supply in cases of large franchisees; larger cable operators are at least 60 percent less likely to offer more favorable terms of trade. However, consistent with transaction cost predictions, asset‐specific investments by the cable operator do curb opportunism; there is a 51 percent increase in the odds of a franchisee offering more concessions for a 1 standard deviation change—about 1,020 mi of the plant. These findings are important for those involved in crafting policy at all levels of government as well as for researchers interested in understanding the role of long‐term contracting and the use of hybrid mechanisms such as franchise agreements in contemporary governance.

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Section: Franchising and Long‐term Contracts As Mechanisms For Publicmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Effects of Competition‐Based Public Policy on Contractual Arrangements

Malatesta

Smith

2011

Policy Studies Journal

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“…If we have a claim-right to do something, then we are entitled to do it. So the liberty of reading Lady Chatterely's Lover does not entitle us to read it (Peacock and Rowley, 1972). We may be negatively free to read it because of that right (no one is stopping us) yet not be effectively free (there is no copy around).…”

Section: Back To MLmentioning

confidence: 99%

Social Choice and the Grammar of Rights and Freedoms

Dowding

2004

Political Studies

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The techniques of social choice and game theory are increasingly being used to analyse concepts in political theory. Although these techniques may prove invaluable for teasing out contradictory formulations, puzzles and problems with traditional concepts, formal writers often begin their analysis with simplistic intuitive accounts rather than building on earlier traditions in analytic political theory. This is no more obvious than with the social‐choice and game‐theory analysis of rights and freedoms. This paper reviews these approaches and demonstrates that by ignoring the grammar of rights and freedoms, social‐choice and game‐theory analysis goes wrong from the very beginning. Formal writers need to take more account of the history of their subject, as developed in the analytic theory tradition.

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“…Besides the methodological considerations to be discussed here, other issues that have been raised in this literature include: the proper level of government to supply redistribution (see Pauly, 1972;Thurow, 1972;Hochman and Tullock, 1973;Buchanan, 1974), implications of theoretical advances for actual redistribution policy (see Peterson, 1973;Daly and Giertz, 1972a;Von Furstenberg and Mueller, 1971), technical theoretical aspects of utility interdependence (see Polinsky, 1971;Bergstrom, 1970Bergstrom, , 1971, and ideological issues surrounding utility interdependence (see Peacock and Rowley, 1972). Detailed treatment of these topics is beyond the purpose of placing the emerging approach in its proper methodological perspective.…”

Section: An Outline Of An Emerging Reorientationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…A complete survey would include the following independent major contributions: Becker (1968), Bergstrom (1970), Freeman (1969), Hochman and Rodgers (1969), Kolm (1969), Olsen (1969), Pauly (1970), Thurow (1972), Zeckhauser (1971). Also of interest are: Aaron and Von Furstenberg (1971), Bergstrom (1971), Brennan (1973aBrennan ( , 1973b, Brennan and Walsh (1973), Brown et aL (1973), Canterbery and Tuckman (1973), Daly andGiertz (1972a, 1972b), Feldman (1971), Garfinkel (1973), Goldfarb (1970), Hochman (1972), Hochman and Rodgers (1970a, 1970b, 1973a, 1973b Hochman and Tulloch (1973), Mishan (1971bMishan ( , 1972, Musgrave (1970), Olsen (1971aOlsen ( , 1971b, Pauly (1972), Peacock and Rowley (1972), Peterson (1973), Polinsky (1971), Rodgers (1973Rodgers ( , 1974, Schall (1972), Scott (1972), Thurow (1973a), Von Furstenberg and Mueller (1971).…”

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confidence: 99%

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Utility Interdependence and Redistribution: Methodological Implications for Welfare Economics and the Theory of the Public Household

Johnston

1975

Public Finance Quarterly

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A rapidly developing literature has focused on utility interdependence as a AbUract basis for a nontraditional approach to redistribution. Discussions in this literature have tended to pursue particular points without reference to the broader context within which such discussions are methodologically situated. Yet an understanding of that context is essential to a reasoned appraisal of much of the literature. This paper attempts to examine that broader context and in doing so to provide clarification of some of the issues which have evolved in the literature. Part one investigates the relationship between the problems which redistribution poses for welfare economics and the theory of the public household. Part two appraises various attempts to circumvent these problems by replacing variousequity rationales for redistribution in the traditional framework with various efficiency rationales. Part three concentrates on the utility interdependence approach often identified with the term "Pareto optimal redistribution" by discussing methodological implications of such an approach for welfare economics and the theory of the public household.

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Pareto Optimality and the Political Economy of Liberalism

Cited by 28 publications

References 2 publications

The Effects of Competition‐Based Public Policy on Contractual Arrangements

The Effects of Competition‐Based Public Policy on Contractual Arrangements

Social Choice and the Grammar of Rights and Freedoms

Utility Interdependence and Redistribution: Methodological Implications for Welfare Economics and the Theory of the Public Household

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