Parliament vs. Supreme court: a veto player framework of the Indian constitutional experiment in the area of economic and civil rights

Bose, Feler

doi:10.1007/s10602-010-9088-2

Cited by 9 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 12 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…By then, while the land reforms acts were held to be valid, the courts took the government to task on issues of compensation (Choudhry et al, 2016). This run-in between the courts and the state went on until 1970, with the courts passing judgments obstructing the actions of the government, and the government in response simply amending the law itself to nullify the court judgments (Bose, 2010;Choudhry et al, 2016;Wahi, 2015). This run-in between the courts and the state went on until 1970, with the courts passing judgments obstructing the actions of the government, and the government in response simply amending the law itself to nullify the court judgments (Bose, 2010;Choudhry et al, 2016;Wahi, 2015).…”

Section: A Political Economy Discourse: Courts Vis-à-vis the State Inmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…So the parliament amended the Constitution again in 1955 and restricted courts from questioning compensation provided by the government (Bose, 2010). This run-in between the courts and the state went on until 1970, with the courts passing judgments obstructing the actions of the government, and the government in response simply amending the law itself to nullify the court judgments (Bose, 2010;Choudhry et al, 2016;Wahi, 2015). The skirmish between the two parties reached its pinnacle during the Indira Gandhi regime when a State of Emergency was declared, which for a while put an end to all judicial reviews of the government's decisions by the court.…”

Section: A Political Economy Discourse: Courts Vis-à-vis the State Inmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Land, Law and Courts in India: Tracing Land Rights Debates through Processes of Judicial Decision Making

Sinha¹

2019

Development and Change

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The pace of industrial and allied infrastructure development in India is encumbered by scarcity in the supply of land. As a result, the state in India has frequently resorted to expropriation of land through conversion of land away from its traditional uses and through displacement of communities. Consequently, land acquisition in the country is mired in disputes over human rights and environmental rights violations. In the face of continued political support for infrastructure-led development in India, those who stand to lose their land have often resorted to judicial recourse for pressing their rights. This article draws on empirical evidence from court cases related to two urban development projects in the states of Karnataka and Kerala to examine how courts have responded to the question of violation of land rights and appeals against land acquisition for the two projects. The author argues that the courts, while responding to the claims against the two projects, have refrained from holding the implementing agencies or the state governments accountable even in cases where there were recognizable incidents of malfeasance. The article illustrates that the inability of the courts to confront the state lends a tacit assent to the development agenda of the state.I am grateful to Glyn Williams, Louise Tillin, Nikita Sud, Sunil Mitra Kumar and three anonymous reviewers for their comments on an earlier version of the article. Needless to say, all errors and omissions are mine.Development and Change 50(4):

show abstract

Section: A Political Economy Discourse: Courts Vis-à-vis the State Inmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: A Political Economy Discourse: Courts Vis-à-vis the State Inmentioning

confidence: 99%

Land, Law and Courts in India: Tracing Land Rights Debates through Processes of Judicial Decision Making

Sinha¹

2019

Development and Change

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…There has been a growing literature analyzing the political institutions incorporating the king and council template, e.g. Abghari (2007) and Hillman (2007) on the political system in the Islamic regime, Bose (2010) on the evolution of the Indian constitution, and Young (2015) on the early Germanic governance from circa 50 bc to ad 50. However, there is no research in the current economics literature using this bipolar political bargaining model to explain the division of powers in the socialist regimes.…”

Section: The Party Chief and Mayor Templatementioning

confidence: 99%

Horizontal “checks and balances” in the socialist regime: the party chief and mayor template

Zhou

2018

Journal of Institutional Economics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

János Kornai's pioneering scholarship examined the mechanisms of the socialist system. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Kornai's main focus was on the transition process in former socialist countries in central Eastern Europe. This paper builds on Kornai's work on the socialist system by analyzing horizontal bargaining within every political branch in contemporary China. I argue that this horizontal bargaining within the party is enhanced by the vertical bargaining. Incorporating Kornai's work on socialism, the “party chief and mayor” template extends the bargaining model from one key figure and one group in the “king and council” template to two key figures and their respective confidants. In addition, it incorporates institutional constraints into the graphical model. It also defines a “collective decision probability function,” which shows how the party chief and mayor model reaches “checks and balances” that limit the policy space, regardless of whether the policy is exogenous or endogenous.

show abstract

“…Constitutional rights have more than once been the subject of close theoretical scrutiny (Sugden (1993)). For instance, Bose (2010) highlighted the central role that constitutional rights play in the institutional game. Elkins et al (2013) have documented the rise of constitutional rights since the end of WWII.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

State provision of constitutional goods

Espinosa

2015

Const Polit Econ

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

International audienceThis paper investigates the impact of constitutional rights on the level of public expenditure in a large sample of countries. To do so, we construct a panel of 73 countries from 1960 to 2011. We first investigate factors that drive constitutional changes regarding constitutional rights. To address potential endogeneity concerns in the choice of constitutional rules, we rely on an instrumental variable within estimation (country and time fixed effects) to estimate the impact of constitutional rights on government size. We find that larger governments tend to inscribe fewer rights in their constitutions, but we do not detect any impact of constitutional rights on the government size

show abstract

Parliament vs. Supreme court: a veto player framework of the Indian constitutional experiment in the area of economic and civil rights

Abstract: Indian constitution, Property rights, Civil rights, Basic structure doctrine, Public interest litigation, Veto bargaining model, Veto player framework, Supreme Court, Parliament, D-74, K-11, K-40,

Cited by 9 publications

References 12 publications

Land, Law and Courts in India: Tracing Land Rights Debates through Processes of Judicial Decision Making

Land, Law and Courts in India: Tracing Land Rights Debates through Processes of Judicial Decision Making

Horizontal “checks and balances” in the socialist regime: the party chief and mayor template

State provision of constitutional goods

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About