Parliamentary Reform at Westminster

Political Leadership in Parliament: The Role of Select Committee Chairs in the UK House of Commons

“…Organisational reforms have progressively delimited the ability of frontbench party business managers and whips to determine committee memberships and thus constrain capacity for action. In 2001, government backbench MPs refused to authorise the slate of new committee members in protest against what was perceived to be the malign influence of party whips in the membership selection process, which prompted internal party changes to membership nomination procedures (Kelso, 2003(Kelso, , 2009a. In 2009, those in favour of a more vigorous select committee system capitalised on the tumult caused by the MPs expenses scandal to successfully secure an overhaul of committee membership processes (Kelso, 2009b;Russell, 2011).…”

More of the Same or a Period of Change? The Impact of Bill Committees in the Twenty-First Century House of Commons

“…In the words of one minister 'it's my bill and I want to amend [it] if it needs amending ' . 29 This is perhaps a response to the long period of Labour Governments with substantial parliamentary majorities across the whole of the modern sample of bills and an 'almost legendary' system of party discipline (Cran, 2005, p. 185), As both Flinders (2002) and Kelso (2009) point out, this has underpinned an executive mentality or dominance which has pervaded all aspects of the legislative system. In the bill committee context, it manifests itself in the extreme reluctance of the government to accept changes to its own bills, particularly those originating from opposition Members.…”

“…for example describes them as 'ritualised' (p. 251), whilst Kelso (2009) notes that they have simply 'preserved executive strength', reflecting the executive's view of Parliament as a 'legislative machine' (p. 36). Even Griffith (1974) himself noted that they can be 'tedious and time-wasting' (p. 52).…”

Parliament on its Knees: MPs' Expenses and the Crisis of Transparency at Westminster

“…The various systems of allowances that developed over time were designed to resource MPs at the individual level, while the development of enhanced House of Commons resources and structures, such as a select committee system later underpinned by a Scrutiny Unit, were designed to build the institutional capacity of the legislature. 10 The increased support for MPs over the past three or four decades, both individually and collectively, has been predicated on the argument that, because of the existence of strong executive government in Britain, 11 there is a substantial asymmetry between the resource base of the executive compared to the legislature, an asymmetry which undermines the health of democracy and the veracity of representative government, is a relatively new concept at Westminster. 14 As it shifts more fully towards 'real' representative democracy, and seeks to address its largely mixed record in terms of communicating and connecting with the public, 15 Parliament must accept that transparency means more than empty gestures and platitudes, or else it places at risk the entire edifice of legitimation on which the British system of government rests.…”