2017
DOI: 10.1613/jair.5407
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Parliamentary Voting Procedures: Agenda Control, Manipulation, and Uncertainty

Abstract: We study computational problems for two popular parliamentary voting procedures: the amendment procedure and the successive procedure. While finding successful manipulations or agenda controls is tractable for both procedures, our real-world experimental results indicate that most elections cannot be manipulated by a few voters and agenda control is typically impossible. If the voter preferences are incomplete, then finding which alternatives can possibly win is NP-hard for both procedures. Whilst deciding if … Show more

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Cited by 3 publications
(3 citation statements)
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References 26 publications
(54 reference statements)
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“…In other election problems, the natural, standard attack is to give integer linear program (ILP) formulations and use Lenstra's algorithm [49]. For instance, this has been applied to winner determination [2], control [36], possible winner [7,17], and lobbying [16] problems. This works because with m candidates there are at most m!…”
Section: Number Of Candidatesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In other election problems, the natural, standard attack is to give integer linear program (ILP) formulations and use Lenstra's algorithm [49]. For instance, this has been applied to winner determination [2], control [36], possible winner [7,17], and lobbying [16] problems. This works because with m candidates there are at most m!…”
Section: Number Of Candidatesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Given that preference and ranking problems are ubiquitous, computational models for solving such problems can improve prediction and lead to new insights. For example, in voting theory and social choice, Bredereck, Chen, Niedermeier, and Walsh (2017) use computational methods to analyze several parliamentary voting procedures.…”
Section: Behavioral Datamentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Fixed-parameter tractability captures the scalability of algorithms to large inputs as long as the problem parameters remain small. Several key problems that arise in AI have been studied in terms of their fixed-parameter tractability, including Planning (Bäckström et al 2012), SAT and CSP (Bessière et al 2008;Gaspers et al 2014), Computational Social Choice (Bredereck et al 2017), Machine Learning (Ganian et al 2018), and Argumentation (Dvorák, Ordyniak, and Szeider 2012).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%