Partial Gift Exchange in an Experimental Labor Market: Impact of Subject Population Differences, Productivity Differences, and Effort Requests on Behavior

Hannan, R. Lynn; Kagel, John H.; Moser, Donald V.

doi:10.1086/342894

Cited by 209 publications

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“…For example, a number of recent studies still report a significantly positive correlation between wages and effort even with an interior optimal effort level instead of a corner solution (Engelmann and Ortmann, 2009), when high stake levels are considered (Fehr et al, 2002), with different productivity levels among employers (Hannan et al, 2002), and for subject pools different from the standard pool of undergraduate ✩ We gratefully acknowledge the thoughtful and constructive remarks of two anonymous referees that improved the paper considerably. students (Hannan et al, 2002). The overall picture that emerges is that fairness and reciprocity considerations play a prominent role in labor relations.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Gift Exchange and the Separation of Ownership and Control

2006

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Gift Exchange and the Separation of Ownership and Control

2006

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“…5 3 Many experimental studies have now con…rmed that higher wage payments indeed trigger positive reciprocity and in turn can lead to higher e¤orts. See, for instance, Fehr et al (1993), Fehr et al (1997), Hannan et al (2002) or Charness (2004). Evidence from …eld experiments is somewhat less pronounced.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Performance Appraisals and the Impact of Forced Distribution—An Experimental Investigation

2013

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. www.econstor.eu The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center and a place of communication between science, politics and business. IZA is an independent nonprofit organization supported by Deutsche Post Foundation. The center is associated with the University of Bonn and offers a stimulating research environment through its international network, workshops and conferences, data service, project support, research visits and doctoral program. IZA engages in (i) original and internationally competitive research in all fields of labor economics, (ii) development of policy concepts, and (iii) dissemination of research results and concepts to the interested public. Terms of use: Documents in D I S C U S S I O N P A P E R S E R I E SIZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be available directly from the author.IZA Discussion Paper No. 5020 June 2010 ABSTRACT Performance Appraisals and the Impact of Forced Distribution: An Experimental InvestigationA real effort experiment is investigated in which supervisors have to rate the performance of individual workers who in turn receive a bonus payment based on these ratings. We compare a baseline treatment in which supervisors were not restricted in their rating behavior to a forced distribution system in which they had to assign differentiated grades. We find that productivity was significantly higher under a forced distribution by about 8%. But also in the absence of forced distribution, deliberate differentiation positively affected output in subsequent work periods.JEL Classification: C91, D83, J33, M52

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“…Examples include populations that differ with respect to occupation (e.g., Cooper, Gu, Kagel and Lo, 1999;Hannah, Kagel and Moser, 2002;Fehr and List, 2004;Carpenter, Burks and Verhoogen, 2005;Güth, Schmidt and Sutter, 2007;Carpenter, Connoly and Meyers, 2008;Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rutström, 2009;Anderson et al, 2010), age (Harbaugh, Krause, Liday and Vesterlund, 2003), and nationality/cultures (e.g., Roth, Prasnikar, Okuno and Zamir, 1991;Henrich et al, 2001;Herrmann, Thöni and Gächter, 2008;Cameron, Chaudhuri, Erkal and Gangadharan, 2009;Henrich, Heine and Norenzayan, 2010). An implicit assumption made in these studies is that any selection bias is identical across populations.…”

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Is there selection bias in laboratory experiments? The case of social and risk preferences

2012

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. www.econstor.eu Laboratory experiments are frequently used to examine the nature of individual preferences and inform economic theory. However, it is unknown whether the preferences of volunteer participants are representative of the population from which the participants are drawn or whether they differ due to selection bias. We examine whether the social and risk preferences of participants in a laboratory experiment represent the preferences of the population from which they are recruited. To answer this question, we measured the preferences of 1,173 students in a classroom experiment. Separately, we invited all students to participate in a laboratory experiment. We find that the social and risk preferences of students who attend the laboratory experiment do not differ significantly from the preferences of the population from which they were recruited. Moreover, participation decisions based on social and risk preferences do not differ significantly across most subgroups, with the exception that female participants are on average less risk averse than female nonparticipants, and male participants are more risk averse than male non-participants. Terms of use: Documents in D I S C U S S I O N P A P E R S E R I E SJEL Classification: C90, D03

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Partial Gift Exchange in an Experimental Labor Market: Impact of Subject Population Differences, Productivity Differences, and Effort Requests on Behavior

Cited by 209 publications

References 11 publications

Gift Exchange and the Separation of Ownership and Control

Gift Exchange and the Separation of Ownership and Control

Performance Appraisals and the Impact of Forced Distribution—An Experimental Investigation

Is there selection bias in laboratory experiments? The case of social and risk preferences

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