Partially Informative Signaling

Stamland, Tommy

doi:10.1006/jeth.1999.2563

Cited by 18 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 5 publications

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“…See alsoStamland (1999), although our equilibria are unlike his. Stamland's "sufficient cost" assumption ensures the separation of high and low types whereas, in contrast, pooling plays a central role in our results (a further difference is that Stamland works with a finite type space).…”

mentioning

confidence: 57%

Lies, damned lies, and political campaigns

Callander

Wilkie

2007

Games and Economic Behavior

146

105

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mentioning

confidence: 57%

Lies, damned lies, and political campaigns

Callander

Wilkie

2007

Games and Economic Behavior

146

105

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“…Given that the agent cares about the market belief on only one dimension of his type, equilibria cannot generally fully reveal both dimensions (cf. Stamland, 1999). We say that an equilibrium is separating if it fully reveals the agent's private information on the dimension of interest; an equilibrium is pooling if it reveals no information on the dimension of interest; and an equilibrium is partially-pooling if it is neither separating nor pooling.…”

Section: Beliefs Payoffs and Equilibriummentioning

confidence: 99%

Muddled Information

Frankel

Kartik

2019

Journal of Political Economy

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We study a model of signaling in which agents are heterogeneous on two dimensions. An agent's natural action is the action taken in the absence of signaling concerns. Her gaming ability parameterizes the cost of increasing actions. Equilibrium behavior muddles information about both dimensions. As incentives to take higher actions increase-due to higher stakes or more easily manipulated signaling technology-more information is revealed about gaming ability, and less about natural actions. A new externality emerges: showing agents' actions to additional observers can worsen information for existing observers. We discuss applications to credit scoring, school testing, and web search.

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“…This definition implies that if a Pareto-dominant equilibrium exists, it is unique. Since a Pareto-dominant equilibrium is a focal equilibrium, we cannot be sure but have reason to believe that players coordinate on this equilibrium (Stamland, 1999;Wang, 2006;Hyndman et al, 2013). All proofs are given in Appendix A.1.…”

Section: Analysis Of Equilibriamentioning

confidence: 99%

Designing Incentive Systems for Truthful Forecast Information Sharing Within a Firm

Scheele

Thonemann

Slikker³

2018

Management Science

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Quantity-dependent part of the utility of Sales v i Error term specific to subject or product i v Value function of prospect theorȳ v Value function of reference point model w First derivative of the distortion function of Sales ξ Trust factor Z Random variable in trust model xvi This thesis is an extended version of Scheele et al. (2017), which is joint work with Ulrich Thonemann and Marco Slikker. It benefited from the comments of four anonymous referees and the editors of Management Science. Preliminary research results have been presented at the following conferences:

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Partially Informative Signaling

Cited by 18 publications

References 5 publications

Lies, damned lies, and political campaigns

Lies, damned lies, and political campaigns

Muddled Information

Designing Incentive Systems for Truthful Forecast Information Sharing Within a Firm

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