Participation constraints of matching mechanisms

Liu, Weifeng

doi:10.1111/jpet.12356

Cited by 11 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 33 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…If the size of the subsidies is chosen optimally, then a Lindahl equilibrium is obtained. In a similar vein, Liu () demonstrates that small matching grants will always secure a Pareto improvement if all consumers are contributors and may secure an improvement when there are some noncontributors.…”

Section: Neutrality and Income Distributionmentioning

confidence: 97%

Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian: Voluntary contributions and neutrality

Faias

Moreno-Garcı́a

Myles

2019

J Public Economic Theory

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

Section: Neutrality and Income Distributionmentioning

confidence: 97%

Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian: Voluntary contributions and neutrality

Faias

Moreno-Garcı́a

Myles

2019

J Public Economic Theory

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…The authors show that variants of serial dictatorship and Probabilistic Serial Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) mechanisms assign at least as many agents as one can match under the constraints, while the violations of the constraints are relatively small. Other papers studying constraints in matching settings include Kamada and Kojima (2015), Bó (2016), Liu (2019), Aygün and Turhan (2020), and Doğan et al (2021), among others.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Assignment maximization

Afacan

Bó

Turhan

2022

J Public Economic Theory

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…In Section 5, we then deal with corner matching equilibria especially focusing on the participation constraint, i.e. on the requirement that both agents are made better off through matching contributions as compared to the original Nash equilibrium without matching (see Liu, 2019 for a formal analysis of participation constraints). The fulfillment of the participation constraint, which sets limits to the application of a matching mechanism, also depends on the income distribution.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Matching in the Kolm triangle: interiority and participation constraints of matching equilibria

Buchholz

Cornes

Rübbelke

2020

JES

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

PurposeIn this paper we show how the Kolm triangle method, which is a standard tool for visualizing allocations in a public good economy, can also be used to provide a diagrammatical exposition of matching mechanisms and their effects on public good supply and welfare. In particular, we describe, on the one hand, for which income distributions interior matching equilibria result, and on the other hand, for which income distributions the agents voluntarily participate in a matching mechanism. As a novel result, we especially show that the “participation zone” is larger than the “interiority zone”Design/methodology/approachWe employ the Kolm triangle approach, which has – compared to most other graphical methods for representing allocations in a public good economy – the advantage that it allows for showing the aggregate budget constraint, the levels of considered agents' private consumption, and the level of public good supply directly in the same diagram.FindingsThe Kolm triangle method can be used to visualize important effects of matching in an elegant way, so basically the increase of public good supply through matching. The interiority of matching depends on the income distribution and especially, on how the “interiority zone” is shrinking when the matching rate increases. Moreover, we were able to delimit the “participation zone” in the Kolm triangle. An important and novel insight is that the participation zone is larger than the interiority zone, which means that also corner matching equilibria in which only one agent makes a positive flat contribution to the public good may make both considered agents better off.Research limitations/implicationsCorner matching equilibria in which only one agent makes a positive flat contribution to the public good may improve all considered agents' welfare. How this welfare effect can be generalized to the case of different utility functions and matching rates will be an issue of future research.Practical implicationsThe examined matching mechanism finds application in many policy fields where public good undersupply is pending. International climate policy is one of these fields of application, for example.Originality/valueThe Kolm triangle method has been particularly helpful to describe the Nash equilibrium in the case of non-cooperative public good provision and to compare this outcome with Pareto efficient public good allocations. Furthermore, the Kolm triangle approach facilitates the analysis of mechanisms for attaining an efficient public good allocation like the Lindahl equilibrium as well as the study of preconditions and limitations faced by such mechanisms. An important and novel insight of our study is that the participation zone is larger than the interiority zone.

show abstract

Participation constraints of matching mechanisms

Cited by 11 publications

References 33 publications

Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian: Voluntary contributions and neutrality

Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian: Voluntary contributions and neutrality

Assignment maximization

Matching in the Kolm triangle: interiority and participation constraints of matching equilibria

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About