Particularism in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics

Leibowitz, Uri D.

doi:10.1163/174552412x628904

Cited by 10 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 30 publications

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“…See Dancy (2004:85-93). For a discussion of the compatibility of (ST) with particularism, see Leibowitz (2009a). 20 I am assuming for the sake of discussion that nihilism is false.…”

Section: 2mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For example, the supervenience of the moral on the non-moral is (arguably) knowable a priori, whereas the supervenience of the mental on the physical is (arguably) journal of moral philosophy 11 (2014) 35-56 23 See, for example, Zangwill (2006). 24 I develop this version of a particularist-friendly explanation of the rightness of actions in Leibowitz (2012). I will say more about it below.…”

Section: Explaining Knowledge Of Particular Moral Factsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For a more detailed discussion of this issue as well as an argument for why a Hempel-style move to "explanation sketches" won't do, see Leibowitz (2011). 27…”

Section: Explaining Knowledge Of Particular Moral Factsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The explanation, or "explanation-sketch", I suggest in the main text is based on the particularist theory I develop in Leibowitz (2012).…”

Section: Explaining Knowledge Of Particular Moral Factsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For a discussion of the distinction between explaining the rightness of actions and providing decision procedures see Leibowitz (2009b).…”

Section: Explaining Knowledge Of Particular Moral Factsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Explaining Moral Knowledge

Leibowitz

2014

J Moral Philos

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In this paper I assess the viability of a particularist explanation of moral knowledge. First, I consider two arguments by Sean McKeever and Michael Ridge that purport to show that a generalist, principle-based explanation of practical wisdom—understood as the ability to acquire moral knowledge in a wide range of situations—is superior to a particularist, non-principle-based account. I contend that both arguments are unsuccessful. Then, I propose a particularist-friendly explanation of knowledge of particular moral facts. I argue that when we are careful to keep separate the various explanatory tasks at hand we can see that a particularist-friendly explanation of the fact that (e.g.,) Jane knows that A is morally right might not be so difficult to come by. Moreover, I suggest that a particularist approach to explaining knowledge of particular moral facts may go some way towards discharging the challenge of moral scepticism.

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“…See Dancy (2004:85-93). For a discussion of the compatibility of (ST) with particularism, see Leibowitz (2009a). 20 I am assuming for the sake of discussion that nihilism is false.…”

Section: 2mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Explaining Knowledge Of Particular Moral Factsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For a more detailed discussion of this issue as well as an argument for why a Hempel-style move to "explanation sketches" won't do, see Leibowitz (2011). 27…”

Section: Explaining Knowledge Of Particular Moral Factsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The explanation, or "explanation-sketch", I suggest in the main text is based on the particularist theory I develop in Leibowitz (2012).…”

Section: Explaining Knowledge Of Particular Moral Factsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For a discussion of the distinction between explaining the rightness of actions and providing decision procedures see Leibowitz (2009b).…”

Section: Explaining Knowledge Of Particular Moral Factsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Explaining Moral Knowledge

Leibowitz

2014

J Moral Philos

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Why Practical Wisdom Cannot be Eliminated

De Caro,

Navarini,

Vaccarezza

2024

Topoi

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Practical wisdom eliminativism has recently been proposed in both philosophy and psychology, on the grounds of the alleged redundancy of practical wisdom (Miller 2021) and its purported developmental/psychological implausibility (Lapsley 2021). Here we respond to these challenges by drawing on an improved version of a view of practical wisdom, the “Aretai model”, that we have presented elsewhere (De Caro et al. 2021; Vaccarezza et al. 2023; De Caro et al. forthcoming). According to this model, practical wisdom is conceptualized: (i) as virtuousness tout court, i.e., as the ratio essendi of the virtues, and (ii) as a form of ethical expertise. By appealing to the first thesis, we counter the charge of psychological implausibility, while we rely on the second thesis to address the accusation of redundancy. In conclusion we argue that the Aretai model implies a significant paradigm shift in virtue ethics. Practical wisdom emerges as both necessary and sufficient for virtuousness, thereby downsizing – without eliminating entirely – the role that individual virtues play in our ethical lives.

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Practical and Theoretical Wisdom in Management Scholarship: Re-assesing the Use and Appropriations of Aristotle’s Philosophy

Peltonen

2021

Philosophy of Management

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Within contemporary discussions on organizational wisdom, management scholars frequently turn to Aristotle’s work to conceptualize wisdom as phronesis, or practical wisdom. Contrary to the prevailing view, this paper argues that Aristotle did not propose an exclusively practical or particularistic conception of wisdom but, instead acknowledged that wisdom broadly conceived consists of two types of intellectual virtue: theoretical wisdom (sophia) and practical wisdom. Aristotle’s ultimate position regarding the relations between sophia and phronesis has remained, however, ambiguous, giving rise to different interpretations, and, more substantively, to the major appropriations of Aquinas, Heidegger and Gadamer. An analysis of the philosophical underpinnings of exemplary contributions to management wisdom suggests that research has predominantly applied Heideggerian and Gadamerian understandings of Aristotelian wisdom, while an Aquinian interpretation is largely absent in contemporary elaborations. Interpreting the Aristotelian notion of wisdom as dedicated purely to practical phronesis narrows the discussion on the nature of (organizational) wisdom within an Aristotelian framework in ways that do not give full credit to the breadth and complexity of Aristotle’s thought.

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Particularism in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics

Cited by 10 publications

References 30 publications

Explaining Moral Knowledge

Explaining Moral Knowledge

Why Practical Wisdom Cannot be Eliminated

Practical and Theoretical Wisdom in Management Scholarship: Re-assesing the Use and Appropriations of Aristotle’s Philosophy

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