Partisan and bipartisan gerrymandering

Konishi, Hideo; Pan, Chen-Yu

doi:10.1111/jpet.12433

Cited by 4 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 25 publications

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“…It goes without saying that these stakeholders must include not only bipartisans and partisans, but also independents (Bierbrauer and Polborn, 2020). Therefore, the practised system in California and Iowa, where so-called non-partisan districting committees act in an advisory role, is a good starting point but not the fi nal solution (Konishi andPan, 2020, 1185).…”

Section: A Proposal For the Internalisation Of (External) Gerrymandering Effectsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Missing the Popular Vote: Pitfalls in US Democracy and Reform Proposals

Sell

Stiefl

2021

Intereconomics

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Only a few years ago, it was a widespread belief that globalisation would trigger processes of democratisation worldwide. However, even old and established democracies such as the United States have recently revealed serious weaknesses. This article shows that the US election system is heavily distorted and recommends profound and transparent Electoral College reforms in the election of US presidents. Furthermore, the article highlights the implications the challenges facing American democracy have for Europe.

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Section: A Proposal For the Internalisation Of (External) Gerrymandering Effectsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Missing the Popular Vote: Pitfalls in US Democracy and Reform Proposals

Sell

Stiefl

2021

Intereconomics

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“…Work by Bierbrauer and Polborn (2020), Pegden et al (2017), and Ely (2019) considers alternative redistricting mechanisms that achieve outcomes the authors consider to be improvements over outcomes resulting from gerrymandering. Konishi and Pan (2020) investigate a gerrymandering setting in which the gerrymanderer is policy-motivated rather than office-motivated. They show that optimal policy for partisan and bipartisan gerrymanderers depends on the flexibility in redrawing the districts.…”

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confidence: 99%

Gerrymandering in the laboratory

An,

Anderson,

Deck

2023

Southern Economic Journal

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Gerrymandering, the drawing of electoral boundaries for political advantage, is a controversial political topic. Previous theoretical work has treated gerrymandering as a one‐stage strategic game against nature, but this paper treats drawing districts as the first stage in a two stage game where parties subsequently compete for undecided voters within districts. In a laboratory experiment, subjects overwhelmingly engage in gerrymandering, which maximizes their probability of winning a majority of the districts and maximizes their expected payoff. However, the subjects self‐report being opposed to the practice in politics regardless of their own political ideology. When forced to draw the electoral map behind a veil of ignorance, the subjects indicate a clear preference for symmetric maps although not the map with the highest theoretical expected payoff. Additionally, while subjects overspend in second stage competition, average spending is similar across electoral maps.

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“…On bipartisan gerrymandering, see, e.g.,Issacharoff (2002),Persily (2002), andKonishi and Pan (2020). The objective of creating competitive districts has not been studied in the literature as far as we know, but it is an established districting criterion in several US states: see, e.g., https://www.ncsl.org/redistricting-and-census/redistricting-criteria.…”

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confidence: 99%