Partisan Change and Shifting Expenditure Priorities in the American States, 1945-1978

Abstract

This article examines the impact of shifts in partisan control of the governorship and state legislatures on longitudinal patterns of expenditure priorities for 38 states from 1945 to 1978. I suggest that such partisan interventions should have an impact on patterns of spending priorities over time only under two circumstances: (1) when the political parties within governmental institutions differ systematically in policy-relevant ways, and (2) when the governmental institution undergoing partisan change has the institutional power relative to other policymaking bodies to translate spending priorities into outcomes. Using a multiple interrupted time series analysis of trends in spending priorities for education, highways, welfare, and health and hospitals, it is found that, in general, partisan interventions do have a nontrivial impact on patterns of spending priorities over time, both in terms of the level (intercept) and trend (slope) of the spending priorities time series. In sum, it would appear that there is more than modest support for the general partisan intervention model of change in spending priorities over time.

Fiscal Policy in the American States

“…States with Democratic governors and Democratic-majority legislatures are expected to allocate higher levels of resources to welfare and education (Garand, 1985). There is also speculation in the literature that high levels of interparty competition has a positive effect on state welfare spending; simply, when interparty competition is high, the two political parties are seen as competing for the votes of low-income voters, who are usually characterized by lower turnout rates.…”

Du diagnostic-pronostic à une psychopédagogie du projet et de l’aide à la décision – L’orientation scolaire et professionnelle comme aide à la réussite de l'individu

“…-L'entretien ADVP de type Garand (1978) reprend les grilles de Kelly (1955) : à partir d'un jeu de cartes, comportant des professions, le sujet va produire ses propres dimensions par une activité de catégorisation (Blanchard, Volvey, Homps et Prieur, 1995).…”

Trade Exposure and the Polarization of Government Spending in the American States

“…4 American state governments also offer a wide range of government ideologies (Garand, 1985;Berry, Ringquist, Fording, & Hanson, 1998;Kelly & Witko, 2012), the spectrum of which largely resembles the left-right government ideologies from a cross-national perspective (Garand, 1985;Berry et al, 1998;Kelly & Witko, 2012). In addition, the states have discretion over social safety net programs and other forms of government spending (Lowery, Konda, & Garand, 1984;Garand, 1985;Garand, 1988;Albritton, 1990;Erikson, Wright, & McIver, 1993).…”

“…Yet, right-wing parties are less likely to do so given that their wealthier base tends to disproportionately benefit from highly interconnected global markets (Tufte, 1980;Garrett, 1998;Huber & Stephens, 2001;Korpi & Palme, 2003 (Garand, 1985;Berry et al, 1998) and that U.S. government elites differ in their responsiveness to the haves and have-nots (McCarty, Poole, & Rosenthal, 2006;Bartels, 2008). As a result, state governments might have distinct reactions to globalization depending on their ideology.…”

“…In addition, the states have discretion over social safety net programs and other forms of government spending (Lowery, Konda, & Garand, 1984;Garand, 1985;Garand, 1988;Albritton, 1990;Erikson, Wright, & McIver, 1993).…”