Partisan dealignment and committee power in five Westminster parliaments

Abstract

What explains the power of parliamentary committees? A large literature on the United States Congress sees strong legislative committees as a consequence of legislators’ incentives to cultivate a personal vote. These incentives are typically understood to be determined by formal electoral rules. How legislatures are elected thus shapes how they are organised. This article argues that explanations of legislative organisation should also consider a non‐institutional source of personal vote‐seeking incentives: voters’ partisanship. Where partisan dealignment is more extensive, legislators have stronger incentives to develop a personal vote. Where committee systems are more powerful, legislators have better opportunities to do so. Partisan dealignment should thus lead to stronger committee systems. This argument is supported by analysis of original data on the postwar evolution of committee systems in five ‘Westminster’ parliaments. Partisan dealignment is associated with larger committee systems, and with larger expansions of committee systems.

‘Stretched But Not Snapped’: A Response to Russell and Serban on Retiring the ‘Westminster Model’

“…(e.g. Collier and Raney 2018; Defty 2020; Fleming 2019; Helms 2020; O'Brien 2019; Wincott et al 2020). Moreover, as Julian Bernauer and Adrian Vatter (2019) have illustrated, the concept of the ‘Westminster model’ has guided sampling strategies in both small-N and medium-/large-N comparative studies.…”

“…In the former, cases may be selected on joint colonial heritage, although such studies are generally focused on a single specific (institutional) trait. Examples include Derek O'Brien's (2019) work on bicameralism in small states, Cheryl Collier and Tracy Raney's (2018) comparative study of parliamentary sexism and sexual harassment, Thomas Fleming's (2019) analysis of partisan dealignment and committee powers, Florence So's (2018) exploration of leadership turnover in opposition parties, or Ludger Helm's (2020) scholarship on ‘heir apparent’ prime ministers in Westminster democracies. Although such small-N comparative analyses can only claim limited generalization beyond the set of selected cases, they are highly valuable since, as a ‘most likely case’ of (former) Westminster models-design, they offer unique evidence of how ‘transplanted’ (or colonially imposed) role models (see Vatter et al 2020) ‘may produce different results and evolve in distinctive ways’ (Altman 2008: 483).…”

Procedural Change in the UK House of Commons, 1811–2015

“…Figure presents one such application. It shows the evolution of rules in four areas that have received attention in existing work on legislative institutions—the role of the executive (Döring ), European integration (Winzen ), parliamentary committees (Fleming ), and rules specific to one of the United Kingdom's constituent nations (i.e., devolution) (e.g., Gover and Kenny ). We categorize subarticles on the basis of keyword searches for relevant words or terms, and then plot the changing number of the subarticles in each category…”

“…third, we illustrate a potential empirical application of the data set, offering an exploratory test of several expectations drawn from recent theories of formal rule change in parliamentary democracies. We conclude that the new data set has the potential to substantially advance our understanding of legislative reforms in the united Kingdom and beyond. there is much recent interest in the origin and evolution of legislative institutions (Binder 1996(Binder , 2006Fleming 2019;rasch, Martin, and Cheibub 2015;schickler 2000sieberer et al 2016;sieberer, Müller, and Heller 2011;sin 2015;spirling 2014;Zubek 2015b). in this article, we contribute to this research by studying parliamentary reforms in the uK House of Commons.…”

“…There is much recent interest in the origin and evolution of legislative institutions (Binder ; Fleming ; Rasch, Martin, and Cheibub ; Schickler ; Sieberer et al ; Sieberer, Müller, and Heller ; Sin ; Spirling ; Zubek ). In this article, we contribute to this research by studying parliamentary reforms in the UK House of Commons.…”