Parts of Propositions

Gilmore, Cody

doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199593828.003.0009

Cited by 23 publications

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“…The question of structure in general, and propositional structure in particular, is a vexed one (Keller 2013;Gilmore 2014;Merricks 2015, chaps 4-5;Glick 2017). I am avoiding some issues by assuming that propositions are structured, and I will not offer a view about what it means for a proposition to be structured.…”

Section: Transparency Of Structurementioning

confidence: 99%

The Structure of Content is Not Transparent

Hodgson

2017

Topoi

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Section: Transparency Of Structurementioning

confidence: 99%

The Structure of Content is Not Transparent

Hodgson

2017

Topoi

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“…One is free, for example, to say that loving is 2-adic but has no argument places. (Though see Gilmore (2013) for critical discussion of various 'slot-free' treatments of adicity. )…”

Section: Objections and Repliesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…,van Inwagen (2004, p. 131), andGilmore (2014). See Dixon (forthcoming) for a development of the analogies between properties, relations, and instantiation, on one hand, and propositions and truth on the other.…”

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confidence: 99%

“…6 We assume that (i) if an open sentence contains exactly n free variables and expresses a relation of some fixed adicity, it expresses an n-adic relation and that (ii) necessarily, no relation is both m-and n-adic, where m ≠ n This leaves open the hypothesis that some relations have no fixed adicity. On the incompatibility of different adicities, seeGilmore (2013). 7 Speaks needs abundant, hyperintensional properties, and it would be ad hoc not to endorse a parallel account of other relations.…”

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confidence: 99%

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Speaks’s Reduction of Propositions to Properties: A Benacerraf Problem

Dixon

Gilmore

2016

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy

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Speaks (2014) defends the view that propositions are properties: for example, the proposition that grass is green is the property being such that grass is green. We argue that there is no reason to prefer Speaks's theory to analogous but competing theories that identify propositions with, say, 2‐adic relations. This style of argument has recently been deployed by many, including Moore (1999) and King (2007), against the view that propositions are n‐tuples, and by Caplan and Tillman (2013) against King's view that propositions are facts of a special sort. We offer our argument as an objection to the view that propositions are unsaturated (non‐0‐adic) relations.

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“…For references to other endorsements of slot theory, explicit and implicit, see Gilmore : fn. 3 and : fn. 43.…”

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confidence: 99%

Upward Grounding

Dixon

2017

Philos Phenomenol Research

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Realists about universals face a question about grounding. Are things how they are because they instantiate the universals they do? Or do they instantiate those universals because they are how they are? Take Ebenezer Scrooge. You can say that (i) Scrooge is greedy because he instantiates greediness, or you can say that (ii) Scrooge instantiates greediness because he is greedy. I argue that there is reason to prefer the latter to the former. I develop two arguments for the view. I also respond to some concerns one might have about the view defended. I close by showing that analogous views regarding the truth of propositions (that if the proposition that p is true, then it is true because p) and the existence of facts (that if the fact that p exists, then it exists because p) are supported by analogs of one of these arguments.

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Parts of Propositions

Cited by 23 publications

References 0 publications

The Structure of Content is Not Transparent

The Structure of Content is Not Transparent

Speaks’s Reduction of Propositions to Properties: A Benacerraf Problem

Upward Grounding

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