Party competition and dual accountability in multi-level systems

Abstract

Sub-national self-governance is on the rise across European democracies. This increasing decentralization changes party competition in multi-level governance systems, and has broad implications for voters' ability to assign political responsibility and to hold politicians accountable. Regarding the interplay between party competition and dual accountabilitythat is, the attribution of accountability to the relevant levelin multi-level governance systems, we propose to distinguish conceptually between an electoral and a governmental arena. Whereas dual accountability in the electoral arena is challenged by varying degrees of party system nationalization, the governmental arena is characterized by a trade-off between the wish for clear-cut dual accountability and the need for political stability. We discuss these challenges in detail and link the various contributions in this special issue to these challenges. We add to the existing literature that increasingly deals with the theoretical and empirical challenges of electoral accountability in ever more institutionally complex systems of multi-level governance.

Does Anyone Care? Cohesion Policy Issues in Sub‐national Politics

“…Since manually recoding 812 election manifestos does not seem feasible, applying sentiment analysis techniques could be a promising step for future research in analysing the party documents in more detail regarding the differences between Eurosceptic and regionalist parties, respectively, and other party families. Third, the focus of the study lies on the ‘electoral arena’ – that is, the time before the elections – and not on the ‘governmental arena’ – that is, the time following the elections (Baumann et al ., 2020). Demonstrating that incumbent parties at the regional level campaign by putting more emphasis on CP issues in their election manifestos than opposition parties, and combining these insights with the empirical fact that incumbent regional governments are more likely to also form the next government (Bäck et al ., 2013), it would be worthwhile to analyse if regional government parties' emphasis of CP issues is mirrored – or even intensified – in their coalition agreements.…”

For whom the bell tolls: Party mediation effects on economic voting in a large democratic federation

“…When policy‐making responsibility is blurred between government and opposition, there is no clarity of responsibility to punish or reward bad or good performance. In a similar fashion, Baumann and others (2020) propose that with an increase in the nationalization of the state party system—or when both levels, national and state, converge—voters may have difficulty in attributing political responsibility to each of the governance levels.…”

“…Proponents of multilevel governance systems have typically assumed dual accountability, as voters will assess performance at different levels independently. According to this ideal perception, dual accountability can only be expected if the policy offers that parties make to voters at the state level differ from those at the national level, when nationalization is low (Baumann et al, 2020; Rodden & Wibbels, 2011).…”

Who Gets Credit? Citizen Responses to Local Public Goods

“…However, an unintended consequence of these reforms is that they introduce uncertainty about who does what; citizens struggle to identify who is responsible for different political sectors, the economy, or the projects that affect their daily lives (Devarajan et al 2009; Gélineau and Remmer 2006). This uncertainty actually reduces a citizen’s ability to hold politicians accountable (Baumann et al 2020). Without clarity of responsibility, the correct level of government is unlikely to be rewarded or punished through retrospective voting (Lago-Peñas and Lago-Peñas 2010; León and Orriols 2016).…”

“…When citizens can identify which politicians are responsible for providing public goods, voting can serve as a referendum on politician performance. However, when citizens cannot identify who is responsible for public goods, politicians may prioritize their own interests over citizen preferences (Baumann et al 2020; Fox and Jordan 2011; Lago-Peñas and Lago-Peñas 2010; León and Orriols 2016).…”