Party Elites’ Preferences in Candidates: Evidence from a Conjoint Experiment

Abstract

Party elites selecting candidates are crucial for the composition of parliament. Yet, despite their pivotal position within the party, we know only little about their preferences for potential candidates and how their own backgrounds shape these preferences. This paper presents results from a conjoint experiment carried out with party delegates chosen to select the candidates for five German parties in the run-up to three state elections. Theoretical expectations derived from the principle-agent framework on delegates’ preferences in candidates are evaluated. Analyses show that delegates prefer attributes indicative of quality and socio-demographic similarity in candidates. Additionally, I show that these preferences for candidates differ between inexperienced and experienced delegates, the latter showing a stronger preference for valence attributes in candidates. These findings contribute to our understanding of the role of personal attributes of selectors for candidate selection and hold crucial implications for the composition of legislatures and long-term effects on public policy.

Personality Goes a Long Way (for Some). An Experimental Investigation Into Candidate Personality Traits, Voters’ Profile, and Perceived Likeability

“…In this article we tackle this issue via innovative experimental data. We present what is, to the best of our knowledge, the first study that manipulates the personality profile of a candidate along well-established personality inventories -and assesses its subsequent effects in terms of voters' perceptions (however, see Rehmert, 2020 andde Geus et al, 2020, for examples of studies that use conjoint experiments to manipulate other salient aspects of the personal profiles of candidates, such as gender or socio-economic background). The design, embedded in an online survey distributed to a convenience sample of US respondents (MTurk, N 1,971), exposed respondents randomly to one of eight different "vignettes" presenting personality cues for a fictive candidate -one vignette for each of the five general traits (Big Five) and one for each of the three "nefarious" traits of the Dark Triad.…”

Revamping the menu – or just offering what’s in stock? Candidate list volatility in open-list PR systems. Evidence from Finland

“…Candidates with strong personal reputations are considered valuable due to their ability to mobilize support and attract new voters to the party. Attractive characteristics typically refer to subjective criteria, like valence (Rehmert, 2020), political experience (Dahlgaard, 2016), name recognition from outside of politics (Arter, 2014) or to more objective criteria such as strong local attachments (Shugart et al, 2005). Loyalty, commitment and ideological stands are also valued traits in nomination processes, but they are likely to be given more weight in closed-list systems where party leaders favour loyalists for control and unity (Rehmert, 2020).…”

“…A decade ago, candidate selection was still 'one of the less discussed mysteries' in political science (Hazan and Rahat, 2010: 7). Recently, the effects of selection methods on the representation of specific groups have attracted attention, but party preferences have remained understudied (Rehmert, 2020). Even the incumbency effect, a well-established determinant of nomination in single-member district (SMD) systems, has only recently garnered attention in studies of list PR systems (Put and Maddens, 2013;Golden and Picci, 2015;Moral et al, 2015;Dahlgaard, 2016;Dettmann et al, 2017).…”

“…To our knowledge, the only longitudinal effort, which is limited to demand-side factors, is Ecevit and Kocapınar's (2018) recent study of Turkish parties, which suggests that even in party-driven closed-list systems, electoral defeats incentivize party leaders to seek strategic list changes. The few other recent, cross-sectional studies have also analyzed closed-list systems (Galasso and Nannicini, 2015;Rehmert, 2020) where candidates' personal reputations generally bear less weight (Carey and Shugart, 1995) than in preferential voting systems.…”

“…Indeed, if 'the closed-list electoral system minimizes selectors' concerns for any single candidate's presumed electability' (Rehmert, 2020), open-list PR system should maximize it. When votes are cast for individual candidates, parties need to present voters with an appealing list of candidates to succeed (Arter, 2013).…”