Party Goals, Institutional Veto Points and the Discourse on Political Corruption: The Evolution of the German Party Funding Regime

A Self-interested Legislator? Party Regulation in Italy

“…655-657). This view is consistent with the position of those other scholars who have claimed that changing political circumstances and societal factors, such as public opinion, and the intensity with which the discourse on political corruption has entered the public agenda, play an important role in influencing the parties' legislative behaviour, encouraging political finance reforms that promote greater transparency and control mechanisms (Paltiel 1980;Nassmacher 1993;Koss 2008).…”

“…Self-serving mechanisms would not explain, for example, reduction of party subsidies, or the convergence towards greater transparency of political finance rules in Europe (Koss 2008). Hence, the literature has pointed to the role of societal and political factors in influencing and shaping the parties' legislative behaviour (Nassmacher 1993;Koss 2008). Examining these questions, Scarrow (2004) proposed a distinction between two main goals that political parties may be interested in pursuing in relation to political finance: 'revenue-maximising' and 'electoral economy' aims.…”

“…Research has been particularly concerned to search for evidence of the cartel party thesis proposed by Katz and Mair (1995), investigating the effects of financial support to political parties on patterns of party competition (Scarrow 2006(Scarrow , 2007, party entry (Tavits 2007;van Biezen & Rashkova 2012), party membership (Casas-Zamora 2005; Whiteley 2011), party system change (Pierre, Svåsand & Widfeldt 2000), and institutionalisation (Booth & Robbins 2010). Results have so far revealed little evidence that party regulation, alone, affects party systems, nor have led to any generalisable conclusions (Koss 2008). Scholars have underlined the difficulty of insulating the effects of party regulation vis-à-vis other institutional and non-institutional factors, such as electoral rules or changes in public opinion (Casas-Zamora 2005;Pierre, Svåsand & Widfeldt 2000;Scarrow 2006;.…”

“…Nassmacher 1993;Scarrow 2004;Gauja 2011;Piccio forthcoming), there is no agreement on whether this perspective ought to be considered the sole possible explanation for party regulation reforms. Self-serving mechanisms would not explain, for example, reduction of party subsidies, or the convergence towards greater transparency of political finance rules in Europe (Koss 2008). Hence, the literature has pointed to the role of societal and political factors in influencing and shaping the parties' legislative behaviour (Nassmacher 1993;Koss 2008).…”

“…After the outcome of the 1993 referendum, the system of public funding of political parties was substantially modified. Assuming the 'electoral economy' view to hold, and political circumstances and public attitudes to play a role in shaping political finance reform outcomes (Scarrow 2004;Koss 2008), we would expect the new system of public funding to reflect the hostility of public opinion and to ensure transparency and mechanisms of effective control over the parties' financial management. As will be shown below, this did not happen.…”