Party Government and Administrative Reform: Evidence From the German Länder

Abstract

Administrative reorganization has become widespread practice in modern democracies. Various case studies highlight the relevance of political ideology for bureaucratic contraction, others the role of socioeconomic pressure and institutional constraints. We examine these explanations in a study of the German Länder, which have substantially contracted their bureaucracies since the 1990s. Quantitative analysis of a novel data set of 479 ministerial departments in 13 Länder over two decades suggests that the ideological complexion of governments is a stronger predictor of administrative reform than socioeconomic pressure or institutional constraints. Moreover, interaction models show how socioeconomic and institutional variables condition the effect of ideology.

Coming to Terms with Termination of Public Organizations

“…Götz et al (2015) show that leftwing governments are less inclined to terminate public organizations than rightwing governments, unless budgetary pressure increases (factors 11 and 13). Similarly, Greasley and Hanretty (2014) conclude that public organizations face higher hazards operating under rightwing governments in 'normal' times (low to moderately high budget pressure).…”

“…Such populations would allow for systemic comparisons between majoritarian and consensual systems but also afford studying the effect of policy preferences of different parties in coalition governments, on administrative reform and organizational termination. It could build forward on findings of Götz et al (2015) and Greasley and Hanretty (2014) that political ideology has different effects under different circumstances or for different organizations. In addition, such future research could look into the link between policy preferences (the Manifestos data on electoral programs) or policy agendas (the Comparative Agendas project) and organizational reforms within specific policy domains.…”

The evolution of research on organizational termination

“…Whether they were case- or empirical-based, most first- and second-generation research studies focused heavily on the US. However, the attention of third-generation studies began to shift to other countries, particularly European ones, although they were still being conducted in individual countries, such as Canada (Glor, 2011), Germany (Götz et al., 2018), Ireland (MacCarthaigh, 2014; MacCarthaigh and Roness, 2012), the Netherlands (Lowery et al., 2013), the UK (Bertelli and Sinclair, 2016; Dommet and Skelcher, 2014; Flinders and Skelcher, 2012; Greasley and Hanretty, 2016; O’Leary, 2015), Korea (Park, 2013), China (Ma and Christensen, 2018), Australia (Corbett and Howard, 2017), Norway (Rolland and Roness, 2012), Liithuania (Nakrošis and Budraitis, 2012), Estonia (Sarapuu, 2012), Hungary (Hajnal, 2012), and Denmark (Mortensen and Green-Pedersen, 2015). At the same time, the US continued to attract scholarly attention (Bevan, 2013; Boin et al., 2010, 2017; Moldogaziev et al., 2019; Shockley, 2012; Van Witteloostuijn et al, 2018).…”

Explaining the survival of public organizations: Applying density dependence theory to a population of US federal agencies

“…It appears that a rising number of public organizations to be funded from a limited budget will fuel competition (Greasley and Hanretty 2016; Götz et al ). When budgets become tight, governing elites are tempted to terminate or replace agencies (Carpenter and Lewis ; Flinders and Skelcher , p. 328; Greasley and Hanretty ; Götz et al ). The ideologies of ‘starving the beast’ and ‘dismantling the welfare state’ typically rely on proposals to cut government expenses in order to curb government expansion (Pierson ; Greasley and Hanretty p. 166).…”

“…While there is little empirical research to support this thesis, public administration scholars frequently offer observations that at least make the thesis plausible. It appears that a rising number of public organizations to be funded from a limited budget will fuel competition (Greasley and Hanretty 2016;Götz et al 2018). When budgets become tight, governing elites are tempted to terminate or replace agencies (Carpenter and Lewis 2004;Flinders and Skelcher 2012, p. 328;Greasley and Hanretty 2016;Götz et al 2018).…”