Party government in 20 democracies: an update (1990–1995)

Woldendorp, Jaap; Keman, Hans; Budge, Ian

doi:10.1111/1475-6765.00378

Cited by 161 publications

(92 citation statements)

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“…A case in point is the indicator by Budge et al (1993) and Woldendorp et al (1998Woldendorp et al ( , 2000. This index places the cabinet on a left-right scale with values between 1 and 5.…”

Section: Measuring Government Ideologymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…I thought this government would have needed to be coded as 3 (center government). Adopting the classification by Budge et al (1993) and Woldendorp et al (1998Woldendorp et al ( , 2000, I constructed an ideology index for the 20 examined countries in Potrafke (2009a) over the period from 1980 to 2003. However, my coding explicitly refers to the left-right scale of the parties in an individual country.…”

Section: Measuring Government Ideologymentioning

confidence: 99%

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Partisan politics: The empirical evidence from OECD panel studies

Potrafke

2017

Journal of Comparative Economics

184

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Partisan Politics: The Empirical Evidence from OECD Panel Studies Abstract This paper describes the empirical evidence on partisan politics in OECD panel studies. I elaborate on the research designs, the measurement of government ideology and why the empirical studies do not and cannot derive causal effects. Discussing about 100 panel data studies, the results indicate that leftwing and rightwing governments pursued different economic policies until the 1990s: the size and scope of government was larger when leftwing governments were in power. Partisan politics have not disappeared since the 1990s, but have certainly become less pronounced. In particular, government ideology still seems to influence policies such as privatization and market deregulation. I discuss the consequences of declining electoral cohesion and what future research needs to explore. JEL-Codes: D720, H000, C230. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may

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Section: Measuring Government Ideologymentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Measuring Government Ideologymentioning

confidence: 99%

Partisan politics: The empirical evidence from OECD panel studies

Potrafke

2017

Journal of Comparative Economics

184

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“…I follow related studies and always include a government ideology indicator because we expect higher labor market regulation under leftwing governments (for a discussion of this issue see, for example, Botero et al 2004). The variable "Government Ideology it " is measured by the indicator presented by Potrafke (2009) which is based on the coding of Budge et al (1993), whose index of governments" ideological positions has been updated by Woldendorp et al (1998Woldendorp et al ( , 2000. This index places the cabinet on a left-right scale with values between 1 and 5.…”

Section: The Empirical Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Labor market deregulation and globalization: empirical evidence from OECD countries

Potrafke

2010

Rev World Econ

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This paper empirically investigates the influence of globalization on various aspects of labor market deregulation. I employ the data set by Bassanini and Duval (2006) The results suggest that globalization did neither influence the unemployment replacement rate, the unemployment benefit length, public expenditures on ALMP, the tax wedge, union density nor overall employment protection. In contrast, protection of regular employment contracts was diminished when globalization was proceeding rapidly. In fact, domestic aspects, such as unemployment and government ideology are more important determinants of labor market institutions and deregulation processes in OECD countries than globalization. For this reason, working conditions of unskilled workers are not likely to deteriorate and the jobs of unskilled workers are not likely to disappear in the course of globalization. All this is, of course, not to insinuate that globalization has any benign influence on labor market institutions.

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“…Thus, I include a variable indicating whether the ethnoterritorial party was a formal member of the governing coalition during the time of the EP election. 29 This information is taken from Woldendorp et al (1998), supplemented for the 1995-2004 period with data from the annual country summaries in the European Journal of Political 27 There is a discrepancy in the coding decisions of Nugent and Farrell and Scully for the EP district structure of Italy in 2004. For the regression analyses, I have followed the work of Farrell and Scully and coded the Italian system as aggregating the vote nationally (i.e., having one national district) for this election.…”

Section: Institutional Control Variablesmentioning

confidence: 99%