Party politics in the European Council

Abstract

This article explores the extent to which the growing party politicization of the EU extends to the European Council. We advance the argument that three central factors shape the extent to which party politics influences European Council outcomes: the salience of an issue along the left-right dimension, the partisan composition of the European Council, and the cohesion and mobilization of transnational parties. We explore the influence of these factors empirically through an inventory of élite interview evidence as well as two case studies -the employment chapter of the Amsterdam Treaty and the Lisbon agenda. We conclude that the conditions for party influence in the European Council are demanding, and that the scope for party politicization is less extensive than in the other major EU institutions. The issues on the agenda of the European Council often cut across partisan divides, the heads of government are seldom mobilized along transnational party lines, and decision outcomes instead tend to reflect issue-specific coalition patterns.

Experiments in Supranational Institution-Building: The European Commission as a Laboratory

“…Findings are more mixed with regard to commissioners: nationality probably explains more of their behaviour; however, nationality is only one of several parts of their compound role, and not necessarily the part most frequently evoked. If one compares commissioners' behaviour with that of executive politicians with a secondary affiliation to a purely territorially arranged structure, such as the European Council, the difference is striking: in the European Council, politics among nation-states seems to be unrivalled (Tallberg and Johansson 2008).…”

Bargaining Power in the European Council*

“…Do national executives seek coalition partners primarily on the basis of power, shared interests, ideological affinities or cultural proximity? Initial research in this area points to the limits of party political mobilization in the European Council and the dominance of issue-specific coalitions driven by interest considerations (Tallberg and Johansson, 2008). Finally, this article invites comparisons between the European Council and summit negotiations in other international contexts, such as the Group of Eight (G-8).…”

Explaining political attention allocation with the help of issue character: evidence from the European Council

“…A first relevant factor could be the ideological composition of the body, measured in terms of overall left-right preferences. While previous research shows that most of the issues discussed by the European Council cut across the traditional party line, party politicisation in this institution is possible (Tallberg and Johansson, 2008). It seems logical to expect ideology to have an effect exactly on the economic character of the agenda, with a stronger emphasis of this dimension during more left-wing orientation periods.…”