Party politics, institutions, and identity: the dynamics of regional venue shopping in the EU

Huwyler, Oliver; Tatham, Michaël; Blatter, Joachim

doi:10.4324/9780429203718-10

Cited by 5 publications

(8 citation statements)

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“…For the subsequent analysis, think-tanks and universities were excluded given their self-defined role of neutral experts as indicated by participants. Government bodies were not included due to their institutionalised channels of influence to the EU that alter their incentive structure to hire consultants (Huwyler et al., 2018).…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Interest groups in the European Union and their hiring of political consultancies

Huwyler

2020

European Union Politics

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Interest groups do not only attempt to influence European legislation by devising and executing their own strategies, or relying on their allies. Almost 50% have also experience in hiring political consultants. Using novel survey data from the policy formulation stage, this study shows that business interest groups are more likely to hire consultancies than non-business interest groups. It suggests that business associations’ higher likelihood of hiring consultancies is linked to membership promotion. For firms, it likely relates to their need for specialised lobbying tools and trust-building measures when seeking private goods from policy-makers. Furthermore, the results indicate that consultancy hiring by business interest groups becomes less likely the more they focus on lobbying. This moderation effect highlights that business interest groups show awareness of principal–agent problems and take mitigating action.

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Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Interest groups in the European Union and their hiring of political consultancies

Huwyler

2020

European Union Politics

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“…These findings are contrasted by Donas et al (2013) and Tatham et al (2014) who observe frequent use of EU level mobilisation of SNAs. Moreover, Huwyler et al (2018) find that legislative regions engage more in EU policymaking than non-legislative regions and that this is even more outspokenly the case for extrastate strategies. These contradicting findings are partly due to the different types of respondents (national level by Huwyler et al and EU level offices by Donas et al) or to the specific focus (legislative activities by Högenauer).…”

Section: Introduction: Europeanization Of Intergovernmental Relationsmentioning

confidence: 92%

Choosing channels. Intra-state and extra-state strategies of Belgian subnational authorities in response to the European Semester

Bursens

Blauwer

2018

Regional & Federal Studies

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Europeanization literature has found that, in general, subnational authorities prefer to target the EU indirectly via member state channels. This article tests whether these findings hold in the non-legislative domain of the European Semester. With respect to the Belgian case, the article concludes that all Belgian subnational authorities indeed primarily use the cooperative intra-state channels as a response to the domestic division of competences and the EU decision-making procedures. It also finds that in addition especially Flanders invests substantially in extra-state strategies towards EU institutions. The article concludes that stronger time constraints, lower compliance pressure and the more politically salient issues of the European Semester trigger the most prosperous and identity prone region to adopt additional extra-state channels on top of the dominant intra-state channels.

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“…Research has shown that venues differ from each other institutionally in many ways and that advocates take features such as internal rules, decision‐making procedures, and institutional actors into account before choosing in which venues to pursue their policy objectives (Constantelos, ; Holyoke et al, ; Huwyler et al, ; Ley, ; Ley & Weber, ; Marshall & Bernhagen, ). In light of this, the first major argument of this article is that Cibus will choose venues that are characterized by institutional “closedness.”…”

Section: Theoretical Frameworkmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This study draws on the concept of venue shopping, which originally relates to advocates who face obstacles in certain decision settings and therefore look out for other ones, which they consider more promising for the promotion of their policy objectives (Baumgartner & Jones, 2009, p. 36). Recently, scientific attention surrounding advocates' decision to select certain venues has increased; scholars refer to this as venue choice (Huwyler et al, 2018;Ley, 2016;Ley & Weber, 2015;Marshall & Bernhagen, 2017). This study concentrates on the factors that influenced Cibus' venue choices when this firm looked out for the most suitable decision settings for promoting NPBT deregulation in the EU multilevel system.…”

Section: Theoretical Frameworkmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This study draws on the concept of venue shopping, which became widespread in the last two decades, especially for analyzing interest group politics (Baumgartner & Jones, ; Beyers, Donas, & Fraussen, ; Beyers & Kerremans, ; Buffardi et al, ; Huwyler, Tatham, & Blatter, ; Pralle, ). Based on various sources, it uses counterfactual reasoning to assess the importance of institutional “closedness” for Cibus’ venue choices as well as a comparative, factor‐based approach to explain the firm’s choices for venues in certain EU member states.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Inside Lobbying on the Regulation of New Plant Breeding Techniques in the European Union: Determinants of Venue Choices

Hartung

2020

Review of Policy Research

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In July 2018, the Court of Justice of the European Union decided that new plant breeding techniques (NPBTs) fall within the scope of the restrictive provisions on genetically modified organisms (GMOs). Previously, various actors had lobbied in order to influence the European Union's (EU's) regulatory decision on NPBTs. This study examines the venue choices taken by Cibus, a biotech company that promoted NPBT deregulation. It shows that the firm bypassed the EU level and that it lobbied competent authorities (CAs) in certain member states to gain support for the deregulation of NPBTs. Cibus chose the CAs because their institutional "closedness" reduced the risk of the debate over the deregulation of NPBTs becoming public. However, the CA's specific competences and their influence on EU decision making were of likewise importance. The firm lobbied CAs based in Finland, Germany, Ireland, Sweden, Spain, and the United Kingdom. Two factors appear to have influenced Cibus' choices for these countries: high-level political support for agribiotech and the high relevance of biotech sectors. In contrast, public support for GMOs turned out to have hardly any influence, and virtually no association could be observed for the agricultural application of biotechnology in the past nor for the weakness of domestic anti-GMO lobby groups. Finally, the in-depth study on Germany affirms that "closedness" was important for Cibus' choices and reveals that technical information served as a venue-internal factor that influenced the firm's choices. KEY WORDS: agricultural biotechnology, inside lobbying, EU multilevel system, new plant breeding techniques, venue choice 关键词: 农业生物技术, 内部游说, 欧盟多层体系, 新植物育种技术, 场地选择 Cabildeo interno sobre la regulación de nuevas técnicas de fitomejoramiento en la Unión Europea: determinantes de lugares para eventosEn julio de 2018, el Tribunal de Justicia de la Unión Europea decidió que las nuevas técnicas de fitomejoramiento (NPBT) están dentro del alcance de las disposiciones restrictivas sobre organismos genéticamente modificados (OGM). Anteriormente, varios actores habían cabildeado para influir en la decisión reguladora de la Unión Europea (UE) sobre NPBT. Este estudio examina las opciones de lugar tomadas por Cibus, una compañía de biotecnología que promovió la desregulación de NPBT. Muestra que la empresa pasó por alto el nivel de la UE y presionó a las autoridades competentes (CA) en ciertos estados miembros para obtener apoyo para la desregulación de las NPBT. Cibus eligió a las AC porque su "cerramiento" institucional redujo el riesgo del debate sobre la desregulación de las Determinants of Venue Choices 93NPBT que se hacen públicas. Sin embargo, las competencias específicas de la AC y su influencia en la toma de decisiones de la UE fueron igualmente importantes. La firma presionó a las AC con sede en Finlandia, Alemania, Irlanda, Suecia, España y el Reino Unido. Dos factores parecen haber influido en las elecciones de Cibus para estos países: el apoyo político de alto nivel para la agrobiotecnología y ...

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Party politics, institutions, and identity: the dynamics of regional venue shopping in the EU

Cited by 5 publications

References 1 publication

Interest groups in the European Union and their hiring of political consultancies

Interest groups in the European Union and their hiring of political consultancies

Choosing channels. Intra-state and extra-state strategies of Belgian subnational authorities in response to the European Semester

Inside Lobbying on the Regulation of New Plant Breeding Techniques in the European Union: Determinants of Venue Choices

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