Party Power or Preferences? Quasi-Experimental Evidence from American State Legislatures

Abstract

Can majority parties control legislative outcomes by controlling the agenda, or are roll call patterns simply the product of legislators' preferences? We argue that, holding members' preferences constant, the majority party's ability to set the agenda gives it the power to influence legislative outcomes. We present the implications of this view of party power formally, and then explore them empirically in two quasi-experiments from American state legislatures. In both, agenda control varies while legislator preferences remain constant. Our consistent finding is that the majority party uses its control over the agenda to screen out bills that would split its own membership, devotes more floor time to bills that divide majority from minority party legislators, and ultimately uses agenda control to protect the policy interests of its members.

Examining Parties as Procedural Cartels: Evidence from the U.S. States

“…Thus, the emphasis of the party cartel theory is the negative agenda power afforded to the majority party through chamber rules (Cox and McCubbins ). Subsequent research has examined the extent of negative agenda control possessed by the majority party in the U.S. context (Cox, Kousser, and McCubbins ; Finocchiaro and Rohde ; Gailmard and Jenkins ) as well as outside the United States (Aleman ; Amorim Neto, Cox, and McCubbins ; Cox, Heller, and McCubbins ; Cox, Masuyama, and McCubbins ).…”

A divided branch: Legislative chambers and the varied effects of party strength on policy outcomes in the American states

“…Research suggests that rules governing committees and vote scheduling, which vary by chamber and are affected by party control (Cox et al, 2010), shape the legislative process within each chamber (Anzia and Jackman, 2013;Jackman, 2014;cf. Diermeier and Vlaicu, 2011).…”

The Changing Nature of Colorado Immigration Laws: 2006-2013

“…It is clear the action of the governor is influenced by his party identification and this was the case for legislators as well (Cox, 2010). Republicans in the legislature had been calling for restrictive immigration laws since 2001 but it was not until 2006 that they found that Democrats were willing to work with them on several of their proposals.…”