Party Switching in the Italian Chamber of Deputies, 1996–2001

Abstract

Almost one‐fourth of the members of the lower house in Italy, the Chamber of Deputies, switched parties at least once between 1996 and 2001. Why would a legislator abandon one party and enter another during a legislative term? Starting from the basic assumption that politicians are ambitious, we examine electoral and partisan motivations for members of parliament (MPs) who switch parties. We conclude that party switching most likely is motivated by party labels that provide little information about policy goals and that pit copartisans against each other in the effort to serve constituent needs. Switching is especially frequent when ambitious politicians operate under heightened uncertainty.

Did Floor-Crossing Alienate South African Voters? Evidence from Municipal Legislatures

“…This results in a large amount of data and makes it feasible to draw sounder general inferences. Studies of legislative floor-crossing typically focus on a single country and a single (national level) deliberative body (Grose and Yoshinaka 2003;Heller and Mershon 2005;Desposato 2006;Thames 2007;Kato and Yamamoto 2009). Given the large number of political, historical, cultural, and economic factors that would confound large cross-national comparisons of floor-crossing patterns in different countries, most studies are designed this way for good reason.…”

“…In others, like Brazil, party switching is a frequent and integral part of party politics. Many recent studies in political science have frequently analysed the correlates and causes of party switching in a variety of global contexts, from the USA (Grose and Yoshinaka 2003) to Italy (Heller and Mershon 2005), Japan (Reed and Scheiner 2002;Kato and Yamamoto 2009), Brazil (Desposato 2006), Ukraine (Thames 2007), the European parliament (McElroy 2003), and South Africa (Mattes 2002;Booysen 2006;Hoeane 2008;McLaughlin 2012). While it is useful and important to develop generalisations about the conditions under which party switching is more or less likely to happen, many provocative questions about the consequences of party switching or 'floor-crossing' have received very little empirical attention.…”

Infrastructure as the Magnet of Power: Explaining Why Japanese Legislators Left and Returned to the LDP

“…Empirical studies that investigate individual-level correlates of party switching in Japan include Cox and Rosenbluth (1995), Kato (1998), Reed and Scheiner (2003), Tatebayashi (2004), and Desposato and Scheiner (2009). Several studies focus on other country cases, including Brazil (Desposato 2006), Italy (Heller and Mershon 2005), and the United States (Yoshinaka 2005).…”

Em que ponto estamos? Sessenta anos de reformas institucionais na Itália (1946-2005)

“…Acrescente-se que o fenômeno das migrações partidárias -presente, sobretudo entre 1994 e 2001, e concentrado nos partidos de centro -determinou a formação de vários grupos ao longo da legislatura, alguns dos quais formaram nova força política (Giannetti e Laver, 2001;Verzichelli, 2003). Em termos mais específicos, sobre a razão da alta taxa de migração partidária, ver Heller e Mershon (2005).…”