Pascal's law: A reply to Haste and Blasi

Conscience at war: On the relationship between moral psychology and moral resistance.

“…Though Bernhardt’s moral reasoning, as assessed by Kohlberg, reflects a capacity for a high level of moral development, it equally reflects Kohlberg’s (as well as Bernhardt’s) “way of standing” in the moral conflict and their “way of seeing and not seeing.” As has been documented by Linn and Gilligan (1990a, 1990b), by assuming impartiality and detachment at the heart of morality, Kohlberg disregarded Bernhardt’s “not seeing” other moral options, such as preventing his comrades-in-arms from continuing to shoot or attend to the wounded. As Bernhardt himself admitted, “When I thought of shooting people I figured: Well I am going to be doing my own war, let them do their own war” (Kohlberg, 1984, p. 549).…”

“…Linn and Gilligan (1990aGilligan ( , 1990b) questioned Kohlberg's argument that Bernhardt manifested a high level of moral reasoning and the extent to which this level of moral competence provided him the opportunity to discern alternative moral actions. Theoretically, and quite unlike Kohlberg's premise, one ought to consider the possibility that a high level of moral reasoning might be an obstacle, as Locke (1983) explained: "The more sophisticated your moral understanding, the more difficult it may be to resolve conflicting moral claims" (p.107).…”

“…I did not train with them” (Faludi, 1999, p. 333). As an outsider, Bernhardt assumed a position of moral separation in the form of nondoing or nonaction (Linn & Gilligan, 1990a, 1990b).…”

“…(Krebs et al 1997, p. 132) Yet the refusers are, quite like those who did not refuse, graduates of the Israeli school system; and it is quite possible that we are not fully aware of the fact that war-time dilemmas are not so linear as mathematical thinking might imply. Moreover, the data suggest that the refusers seemed unique in their ability to assume a courageous lonely position of criticism, which was required for the sake of disobedience (Fromm, 1981), while leaving the others to carry the burden of their conscience (Linn & Gilligan, 1990a, 1990b). It is important to note that many of the soldiers who participated in the war also assumed a position of criticism: They wrote letters to the press, they demonstrated, and they asked questions.…”

“…Nor would it be hard to provide new data that might question whether Kohlberg’s exemplary combatant/critic was in fact or could be regarded as a post-conventional moral thinker. This may be accomplished by the deconstruction of Kohlberg’s separate position for criticism, with its single just truth, and the reframing of criticism as a connected position with multiple just truths (Linn & Gilligan, 1990a, 1990b).…”