'Passauer Wahlbörse': Information Processing in a Political Market Experiment

Beckmann, Klaus; Werding, Martin

doi:10.1111/j.1467-6435.1996.tb01391.x

Cited by 10 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 18 publications

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“…5 Organisation: Wolfgang Wiegard, Christian Gliesmann und Christian Haslbeck (Universität Regensburg); Matthias Wrede (Universität Bamberg); Joachim Weimann, Bettina Vaupel und Carsten Vogt (Universität Bochum); Gregor Brüggelambert (Universität GH Essen). 6 Im Unterschied zu den Börsen vom Typ IPSM, die wie oben erläutert "double auction"-Märkte waren, organisierten Beckmann / Werding (1996) ihre Börsen als "Kassamarktinstitutionen". Dazu wurden im Verlauf einer Woche die Kauf-und Verkaufsgebote der Teilnehmer gesammelt.…”

Section: üBersicht Und Prognosegüteunclassified

“…Zu einem bestimmten Zeitpunkt wurden daraufhin die aggregierten Nachfrage-und Angebotsfunktionen ermittelt und nach einem festgelegten Schema einheitliche Markpreise bestimmt sowie die entsprechenden Transaktionen durchgeführt. Beckmann / Werding (1996) hatten für ihren Markt ebenfalls einen Einfluß der Umfragen beobachtet. Die dazu durchgeführte Analyse weist jedoch nicht unerhebliche Mängel auf (vgl.…”

Section: üBersicht Und Prognosegüteunclassified

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Meinungsumfragen als informationstragende Institutionen

Brüggelambert¹

1997

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Section: üBersicht Und Prognosegüteunclassified

Meinungsumfragen als informationstragende Institutionen

Brüggelambert¹

1997

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“…However, the "Marginal Trader Hypothesis" is challenged by other theories and empirical findings. Beckmann and Werding (1996); Bruggelambert (2004) find no evidence of the presence of unbiased traders in prediction markets. Surowiecki (2004) also raises doubts on the power of a small group of "marginal traders" to offset the majority.…”

Section: Theoretical Foundationmentioning

confidence: 95%

A study of efficiency in New Zealand election prediction markers

Cao¹

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<p>The development of prediction markets has naturally given rise to studies of their efficiency. Most studies of efficiency in prediction markets have focused on the speed with which they incorporate information. A necessary (but not sufficient) condition of efficiency is that arbitrage opportunities must non-existent or transitory in nature so that the systematic generation of abnormal profits is not possible. Using data from New Zealand’s first prediction market, iPredict, I examine the potential for arbitrage in the contracts for the party vote for the 2011 General Election. Relative to the risk-free interest rate, the returns from arbitrage are generally low, consistent with an efficient market. Regression analysis requires that the data not be subject to the possibility of spurious regressions - something that is not addressed in the literature. After confirming the non-stationarity of the price level and the stationarity of the price changes by the unit root test, I use the iPredict data in conjunction with opinion poll data to test whether the polls impact on market pricing behaviour. Using a number of different model types, I find that the opinion poll data has a very limited impact on market prices, suggesting that the information contained in the poll is largely already incorporated into market prices.</p>

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“…While many authors in the field cite the theory of marginal traders as explanation for the efficient information aggregation in IMs few have raised doubts and have sought to address this issue with further research and empirical evidence. For instance, other authors (Bruggelambert 2004;Beckmann & Werding 1996) conducted analysis of data from several German political stock markets using the framework of Forsythe et al (1992) but found no evidence for the superior rationality of marginal traders. Marginal traders in these markets did not systematically purchase shares of true favourites but preferred to buy share of candidates for which showed a preference as well regardless of their true winning chances.…”

Section: From Beliefs To Market Pricesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Κοινωνική Υπολογιστική Και Αγορές Πληροφορίας

Μπόθος¹

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This type of emerging 'collective intelligence' has received various definitions. Malone and Klein (2007) define collective intelligence as the synergistic and cumulative channelling of the vast human and technical resources now available on the Internet. Kapetanios (2008) introduces this paradigm as "human-computer systems in which machines enable the collection and harvesting of large amounts of human-generated knowledge, while enabling emergent knowledge, i.e. computation and inference over the collected information, leading to answers, discoveries, or other results that are not found in the human contributions".Information markets (IMs), also known as prediction markets, decision markets, idea Research question 3:What is the performance of preference markets against alternative approaches? This research question aims at exploring the performance of preference markets against alternative approaches in terms of the quality and quantity of user generated content. The performance of markets for forecasting purposes has been extensively studied and proven as it will be shown in Chapter 3. Recent work has provided qualitative comparisons of

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'Passauer Wahlbörse': Information Processing in a Political Market Experiment

Cited by 10 publications

References 18 publications

Meinungsumfragen als informationstragende Institutionen

Meinungsumfragen als informationstragende Institutionen

A study of efficiency in New Zealand election prediction markers

Κοινωνική Υπολογιστική Και Αγορές Πληροφορίας

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