Passive and Active Combined Attacks: Combining Fault Attacks and Side Channel Analysis

Amiel, Frédéric; Villegas, Karine; Feix, Benoit; Marcel, Louis

doi:10.1109/fdtc.2007.4318989

Cited by 17 publications

(23 citation statements)

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“…Horizontal CPA-Based Combined Attack: This paper points out that the right-to-left version of square-always algorithm is vulnerable to a novel combined attack when the same fault injection model used in the atomicity-based square-and-multiply algorithm in (Amiel et al, 2007) is applied. However, power analysis approach methods of two attacks are different.…”

Section: Improvement Of the Square-always Algorithmmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…They present two types of exponentiation algorithms; left-toright and right-to-left methods. Because the left-to-right-type algorithm is highly vulnerable to the doubling attack (Fouque & Valette, 2003) and the chosen-message SPA attack and is more likely to be subject to combined attacks (Amiel et al, 2007), the right-to-left version of square-always algorithm is generally preferred to the left-to-right one. Their right-to-left multiply-always exponentiation algorithm follows the computational routine of the atomicity-based multiply-always algorithm and uses equation (5) to compute a multiplication.…”

Section: Square-always Exponentiation Algorithmmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…SPA-Based Combined Attack: Recently, Amiel et al (Amiel et al, 2007) presented a combined attack on the atomicity-based square-and-multiply algorithm by combing the FA and the SPA attack. To recover the secret key, the attacker inserts an intensive error to bypass a step during the execution of the exponentiation.…”

Section: Side-channel Attacks On Rsamentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This paper highlights that the right-to-left version of square-always algorithm is vulnerable to some side-channel attacks, so-called collision distance-based doubling attack, chosen-message CPA (collision power analysis) attack, and horizontal CPA-based combined attack. Among these, collision distance-based doubling and chosen-message CPA attacks can be considered extensions of the doubling attack (Fouque & Valette, 2003;Yen, Lien, Moon, & Ha, 2005), and the horizontal CPA-based combined attack is a variant of the SPA-based combined attack (Amiel, Villegas, Feix, & Mercel, 2007). To improve and extend previous findings (Ha, Choi, Choi, & Lee, 2014), this paper proposes a new right-to-left square-always exponentiation algorithm that can resist existing and proposed side-channel attacks and be easily adopted to implement the CRT-RSA exponentiation resistant to the Bellcore attack.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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An Improved Square-always Exponentiation Resistant to Side-channel Attacks on RSA Implementation

Choi

Lee

et al. 2016

Intelligent Automation & Soft Computing

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Many cryptographic algorithms embedded in security devices have been used to strengthen homeland defense capability and protect critical information from cyber attacks. The RSA cryptosystem with the naive implementation of an exponentiation may reveal a secret key by two types of side-channel attacks, namely passive leakage information analysis and active fault injection attacks. Recently, a square-always exponentiation algorithm in which the multiplication is traded for squarings has been proposed. This novel algorithm for RSA implementation is faster than other regularity-based countermeasures and is resistant to SPA (simple power analysis) and fault injection attacks. This paper shows that the right-to-left version of square-always exponentiation algorithm is vulnerable to several side-channel attacks, namely collision distance-based doubling, chosen-message CPA (collision power analysis), and horizontal CPA-based combined attacks. Furthermore, an improved right-to-left squarealways algorithm adopting the additive message blinding method and the intermediate message update technique is proposed to defeat previous and proposed side-channel attacks. The proposed exponentiation algorithm can be employed for secure CRT-RSA (RSA based on the Chinese remainder theorem) implementation resistant to the Bellcore attack. The paper presents some experimental results for the proposed power analysis attacks using an evaluation board.

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Section: Improvement Of the Square-always Algorithmmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Square-always Exponentiation Algorithmmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Side-channel Attacks On Rsamentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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An Improved Square-always Exponentiation Resistant to Side-channel Attacks on RSA Implementation

Choi

Lee

et al. 2016

Intelligent Automation & Soft Computing

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“…In practice, the proposed generator is implemented in an FPGA on the Sidechannel Attack Standard Evaluation Board (SASEBO) [10] and, therefore, it can be used as a common experimentation environment for fault injection attacks, where the glitchyclock signals are reproducible. It can also be used to investigate sophisticated attacks combining fault injection attacks and side-channel attacks [11].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

An on-chip glitchy-clock generator for testing fault injection attacks

et al. 2011

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This paper presents a glitchy-clock generator integrated in FPGA for evaluating fault injection attacks and their countermeasures on cryptographic modules. The proposed generator exploits clock management capabilities, which are common in modern FPGAs, to generate clock signal with temporal voltage spike. The shape and timing of the glitchy-clock cycle are configurable at run time. The proposed generator can be embedded in a single FPGA without any external instrument (e.g., a pulse generator and a variable power supply). Such integration enables reliable and reproducible fault injection experiments. In this paper, we examine the characteristics of the proposed generator through experiments on Side-channel Attack Standard Evaluation Board (SASEBO). The result shows that the timing of the glitches can be controlled at the step of about 0.17 ns. We also demonstrate its application to the safe-error attack against an RSA processor.

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