2015
DOI: 10.1080/09592318.2013.866426
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Past failures and future problems: the psychology of irregular war

Abstract: Personal cognitive processes inform how individuals understand their environment. Cultural variation, fundamental attribution error, causal attribution, and durability bias create obstacles to Western understanding of irregular war and have created a significant institutional bias in how the US military perceives its enemies-a perception only somewhat softened after a decade of irregular war. United Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) is in a better position to overcome these problems through persistent engag… Show more

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
1
1

Citation Types

0
2
0

Year Published

2018
2018
2023
2023

Publication Types

Select...
1
1
1

Relationship

0
3

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 3 publications
(2 citation statements)
references
References 25 publications
0
2
0
Order By: Relevance
“…Furthermore, fundamental attribution error is at play (cf. Beukel, 1992;Markedonov, & Suchkov, 2020;Reynolds, 2015): U.S. attributes China's military build-up to hostile intentions rather than circumstances (Moore, 2010). Same holds for Indonesian officials (Yeremia, 2020).…”
Section: The Political Psychology Of 'China Threat'mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Furthermore, fundamental attribution error is at play (cf. Beukel, 1992;Markedonov, & Suchkov, 2020;Reynolds, 2015): U.S. attributes China's military build-up to hostile intentions rather than circumstances (Moore, 2010). Same holds for Indonesian officials (Yeremia, 2020).…”
Section: The Political Psychology Of 'China Threat'mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Within the context of irregular warfare, such as counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and stability operations, Phil Reynolds argues that information is filtered and processed by cultural norms, with military planners and defense decision makers particularly susceptible to these influences. 115 According to Reynolds, culture affects the way military leaders “read” the security environment, perceive connections, and react to the enemy. In the cases of Afghanistan and Iraq, U.S. forces with strong independent mind-sets experienced cultural blindness when operating in people-centric conflicts because they often attributed “actions to individuals’ internal traits at a greater rate than to environmental factors.” 116 Because of their strong independent mind-set, many American soldiers easily overlooked the external constraints that influence the enemy’s behavior, such as role obligation and other social pressures common in collectivist cultures.…”
Section: Revisiting the “Culture Turn” In Foreign Policy Analysis: Inmentioning
confidence: 99%