Patent Disclosure in Standard Setting

Ganglmair, Bernhard; Tarantino, Emanuele

doi:10.2139/ssrn.1957991

SSRN Journal

2011

DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1957991

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Patent Disclosure in Standard Setting

Bernhard Ganglmair

Emanuele Tarantino

Abstract: We present a model of industry standard setting with two-sided asymmetric information about the existence of intellectual property. We provide an equilibrium analysis of (a) firms' incentives to communicate ideas for improvements of an industry standard, and (b) firms' decisions to disclose the existence of intellctual property to other participants of the standardization process.JEL classification: D71, L15, O34

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“…Our results do not change qualitatively when asymmetric information is two‐sided, that is, both agents may have a secret (Ganglmair and Tarantino, ).…”

mentioning

confidence: 51%

Conversation with secrets

Ganglmair¹,

Tarantino

2014

The RAND J of Economics

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We analyze the sustainability of a conversation when one agent might be endowed with a piece of private information that affects the payoff distribution to its benefit. Such a secret can compromise the sustainability of conversation. Even without an obligation, the secret holder will disclose its secret if it prevents preemptive termination of the conversation. The nonsecret holder lacks this possibility and stops the conversation. Competition and limited effectiveness of the conversation amplify this result of early disclosure and render the conversation process less sustainable. We discuss policy and managerial implications for industry standard development and joint ventures.

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“…Our results do not change qualitatively when asymmetric information is two‐sided, that is, both agents may have a secret (Ganglmair and Tarantino, ).…”

mentioning

confidence: 51%

Conversation with secrets

Ganglmair¹,

Tarantino

2014

The RAND J of Economics

Self Cite

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Complementary Patents and Market Structure

Schmidt¹

2014

Economics Manag Strategy

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Many high technology goods are based on standards that require several essential patents owned by different IP holders. This gives rise to a complements and a double mark-up problem. We compare the welfare effects of two different business strategies dealing with these problems. Vertical integration of an IP holder and a downstream producer solves the double mark-up problem between these firms. Nevertheless, it may raise royalty rates and reduce output as compared to non-integration. Horizontal integration of IP holders solves the complements problem but not the double mark-up problem. Vertical integration discourages entry and reduces innovation incentives, while horizontal integration always benefits from entry and innovation.

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Patent Disclosure in Standard Setting

Cited by 2 publications

References 31 publications

Conversation with secrets

Conversation with secrets

Complementary Patents and Market Structure

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