Patents, imitation and welfare

Mukherjee, Arijit; Ray, Achintya

doi:10.1080/10438590600661855

Cited by 9 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 22 publications

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“…Otherwise, he keeps waiting and lets X evolve. In this respect, we follow the conjecture by Mukhejee and Ray (2007) that imitation costs are significant, but not prohibitive.…”

Section: The Set-up Of the Modelmentioning

confidence: 85%

Innovation and imitation as an interactive process

Scandizzo

Ventura

2016

Economics of Innovation and New Technology

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This article deals with the problem of the coexistence of innovators and imitators in a competitive market. The study proposes a model of innovation and diffusion of productive knowledge as an interactive process between innovators and imitators under conditions of dynamic uncertainty. The process can be modelled as a Stackelberg game, where the innovator acts as a leader in choosing whether to share knowledge or set up private protection and the imitator as a follower in choosing when becoming active. Under these conditions, activation thresholds are derived for both innovators and imitators. If protection policies are effective, the imitator can be trapped into an inaction region by the innovator. Thus, there will be two regimes without and with diffusion, according to whether the inaction region is enacted or not. Under these conditions, discovery and diffusion appear to be dynamic complements, as a higher speed of activation of innovating firms is favoured by a higher level of imitation and a higher speed of activation of imitating firms is favoured by a higher level of discoveries. In order to explore some of the quantitative implications of these results, the paper also proposes an application of the model to four European countries. ARTICLE HISTORY

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“…Otherwise, he keeps waiting and lets X evolve. In this respect, we follow the conjecture by Mukhejee and Ray (2007) that imitation costs are significant, but not prohibitive.…”

Section: The Set-up Of the Modelmentioning

confidence: 85%

Innovation and imitation as an interactive process

Scandizzo

Ventura

2016

Economics of Innovation and New Technology

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“…As mentioned in the introduction, it has been shown that licensing can be profitable in a repeated‐game setting because it serves as a commitment device for collusion, as in Eswaran (1993), or allows to save imitation costs, as in Mukherjee and Ray (2007). To see that infinitely repeated games would not lead to fundamentally new insights in our basic model, assume first that the licensing and the no‐licensing equilibria coexist in a single‐stage game.…”

Section: Discussion Of Our Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The idea is that competition becomes more intense such that profits in the non‐cooperative Nash equilibrium decline if firms cross‐license. In a repeated‐game setting, Mukherjee and Ray (2007) show that cross‐licensing may raise profits of firms if it saves imitation costs. Finally, Arora and Fosfuri (2003) analyze licensing decisions of incumbent firms in a differentiated Cournot oligopoly 2 .…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

International Technology Transfers and Competition*

Feess¹,

Hoeck²,

Lorz³

2009

Rev International Economics

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This paper analyzes North-South technology transfers in a model of oligopolistic competition and spatial product differentiation. Two firms in the North supply a high-tech good and a technically related low-tech good.They decide about licensing the low-tech good to suppliers in the South.With the license Southern firms get access to technology from the North, which enables them-with a certain probability-to enter the market for the high-tech good. Northern firms may therefore license strategically to influence the competitive environment in the high-tech market. In this setting, multiple equilibria with and without licensing may arise, and the resulting outcomes may be inefficient from the viewpoint of the Northern firms.

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“…Let ) 1 , 0 ( ∈ α be the product market competition, each firm is uncertain about the type of its contender, and thus each firm has private information about its actual unit cost. 4 See, in this context, Mukherjee and Ray (2007) which discusses the effects of process patents on innovation and welfare. probability of success; therefore, failure occurs with probability ) 1 ( α − .…”

Section: Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cooperative vs. non-cooperative R&D incentives under incomplete information

Kabiraj

Chattopadhyay

2014

Economics of Innovation and New Technology

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This paper studies incentives for cooperative research vis-à-vis non-cooperative research in an incomplete information framework. We show that with quantity competition under asymmetric information, the expected payoff from non-cooperative research goes down compared to the case of symmetric information; hence RJV incentives of the firms are larger under asymmetric information. In either case, however, the larger is the size of the cost-reducing innovation the lower is the incentive for cooperative research. Finally in our model, incomplete information does not affect the consumers' welfare, but the firms become worse off.

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Patents, imitation and welfare

Cited by 9 publications

References 22 publications

Innovation and imitation as an interactive process

Innovation and imitation as an interactive process

International Technology Transfers and Competition*

Cooperative vs. non-cooperative R&D incentives under incomplete information

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