Path Semantics for Indicative Conditionals

Abstract

The literature on indicative conditionals contains two appealing views. The first is the selectional view: on this view, conditionals operate by selecting a single possibility, which is used to evaluate the consequent. The second is the informational view: on this view, conditionals don’t express propositions, but rather impose constraints on information states of speakers. Both views are supported by strong arguments, but they are incompatible on their standard formulations. Hence it appears that we have to choose between mutually exclusive options. But the options are not exclusive. This paper develops a theory of the semantics and assertability of conditionals that is both selectional and informational. The theory vindicates the signature inferences of both selectional and informational theories, including so-called Conditionals Excluded Middle and principles about the interplay between conditionals and ‘might’. It also predicts some interesting and puzzling facts about the assertion of conditionals.

Probabilities of conditionals: Updating Adams

“…This enterprise involves not only assigning suitable semantic values to such sentences, but also formulating more general accounts of logical notions like consequence, speech acts like assertion, attitudes like acceptance, credence, and desire, and mental acts like supposition. For some recent contributions see, among others: (Gillies, 2004;Yalcin, 2007Yalcin, , 2015Swanson, 2011Swanson, , 2016Bledin, 2014Bledin, , 2020Starr, 2014;Moss, 2015;Goldstein, 2019aGoldstein, , 2019bCiardelli, 2020;Punčochář & Gauker, 2020;Hawke & Steinert-Threlkeld, 2021;Cantwell, 2021;Santorio, 2022b;Goldstein & Santorio, 2021).…”