Patients’ health or company profits? The commercialisation of academic research

Abstract

This paper is a personal account of the events associated with the author's work at the University of Toronto's Hospital for Sick Children on a drug, deferiprone, for the treatment of thalassaemia. Trials of the drug were sponsored by the Canadian Medical Research Council and a drug company which would have been able, had the trials been successful, to seek regulatory approval to market the drug. When evidence emerged that deferiprone might be inadequately effective in a substantial proportion of patients, the drug company issued legal threats when the author proposed informing her patients and the scientific community. Until protests were made by international authorities in her field of research, the hospital and university did not adequately support the author's academic freedom and responsibilities as a medical practitioner. It is argued that underlying cause of this, and of other similar cases, is the political philosophy which is driving the commercialisation of universities and bringing about the deregulation of drug approval procedures. Together these changes constitute a serious threat to the public good.

Public Perceptions of Physician–Pharmaceutical Industry Interactions: A Systematic Review

“…furthermore, the majority of studies were individually narrow in scope, focusing on a specific type of interaction (for example, financial interactions). The few studies that have explored a range of potential physician-pharmaceutical interactions are now dated and may not capture the opinions of the current population, particularly given the negative media attention that the pharmaceutical industry has received in recent years (Psaty and Kronmal 2008;Puttagunta et al 2002;Kondro 2004;Olivieri 2003). Additionally, the majority of studies examined the opinions of specific patient populations, rather than the general public.…”

“…furthermore, select groups of physicians are asked to lead industry-funded research, sit on advisory boards and deliver industry-developed presentations (Campbell et al 2007;Ross et al 2008;Kaiser family foundation 2002;Holmer 2001). While these interactions have resulted in important clinical benefits, such as the advancement of valuable treatments (stossel 2005), a number of highly publicized adverse events have also occurred (Psaty and Kronmal 2008;Kondro 2004;Olivieri 2003). The effects of physician-pharmaceutical industry interactions on physician behaviour have been reviewed and suggest an impact on prescribing practices, professional behaviour and attitude towards interactions with the pharmaceutical industry (Wazana 2000).…”

La croissance technologique et la privatisation passive des systèmes publics de santé : le cas du Québec

“…Les compagnies qui financent ces tests ont interdit la publication des résultats sans le consentement de la compagnie en question, ont supprimé la rédaction de publication défavorable à leurs produits et ont menacé certains scientifiques ayant obtenu des résultats négatifs de coupure dans les fonds à venir pour la recherche (Fisher, 2003;259). Au Canada comme aux États-Unis, les chercheurs mènent leurs essais cliniques sur la base d'une entente contractuelle dans laquelle est incluse une clause de confidentialité empêchant toute publication indépendante par rapport à l'entreprise pharmaceutique mère du produit médicamenteux testé (Gibson, Baylis et Lewis, 2002;Baird, Downie et Thompson, 2002;Fisher, 2003;Baird, 2003;Cassels et al, 2003;Olivieri, 2003).…”

The Outlook for U.S. Meteorological Research in a Commercializing World: Fair Early, but Clouds Moving in?

“…Of course, sometimes commercially neutral or unfavorable results turn up anyway, and researchers wish to publish them. In some such situations, companies have resorted to more direct interference, including, in several high-profile cases, trying to block dissemination of unfavorable results through threats, lawsuits, campaigns to discredit researchers, and even outright harassment (e.g., Deyo et al 1997;Shenk 1999;Hailey 2000;Oliveri 2003). Because most cases of company interference in research probably never become public, the prevalence of such overt interference is unknown.…”

“…Industry now funds more than $2.3 billion in university research each year-an increase of nearly 50% over the last decade (accounting for inflation; NSF 2003)-and this amount does not include the major corporate contributions to universities for buildings, equipment, endowed chairs, and activities such as athletics. As universities chase commercial resources, the strings attached are leading them to act more and more like institutions with profit, rather than knowledge and education, as their primary mission (e.g., Slaughter and Leslie 1997;Brown 2000;Press and Washburn 2000;Bok 2003;Oliveri 2003). The gains are proving to be short term at best and illusory at worst; patent-related litigation and staffing expenses are increasing rapidly, and only a few elite universities have realized the hoped-for commercialization-related profits (AUTM 2002;Mowery 2002;Bok 2003).…”