Patronage Incentives in Urban Public Transport Contracts — Appraisal of Practice and Experience to Date

How does interchange affect passengers’ route choices in urban rail transit? – a case study of the Shanghai Metro

“…(Guo and Wilson 2011). However, it is usually held constant, with identical values for the same types of interchange situations regardless of interchange environments (Cheng et al 2019;Douglas and Karpouzis 2006;Jung and Casello 2019;Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, 2012;Transport for London 2013;Wallis, Lawrence, and Douglas 2013). There is scant literature on how environment variables influence pure penalty.…”

Performance Based Contracts

“…In addition, we note the payment model adopted for funding from central to regional governments under the New Zealand Patronage Funding scheme (Wallis 2003). This essentially is of the 'gross cost plus economic-based patronage incentive' type, with the level of funding to each region depending on the numbers of peak and off-peak passengers carried (based on user benefit and externality benefit rates).…”

Kickstarting growth in bus patronage: Targeting support at the margins

“…By the end of the funding period supported services are expected to achieve financial sustainability and ideally to become commercially viable through patronage growth. Experience with this type of targeted approach is limited to examples in New Zealand, an experimental service in Perth, Scotland where the approach yielded high rates of patronage growth (Wallis, 2005, Souter et al, 2004 and in Bristol where 17 services were moved to commercial operation (Bentley and Lynch, 2001). This paper is based on an assessment of the performance of the Kickstart and BRDG schemes undertaken for the Department for Transport and the Scottish Executive in 2006 (Bristow et al, 2007).…”