Patronage, Trust, and State Capacity

Abstract

WHen do politicians engage in clientelistic exchange with their voters? direct or mediated patron-client relations built on personal ties preceded the emergence of faceless bureaucracies tasked with ambitious public projects.1 yet clientelism, a seemingly ancient way of getting things done in exchange for votes, flourishes even among wealthy democracies in the twenty-first century. 2 We focus on the historical origins of trust in the state and show that they have a lasting impact on patronage. We argue that lack of trust in the state, rather than affluence, greases the wheels of patron-client linkages.3 trust, which ultimately reduces clientelism, originates in competence. Where public administration has historically failed to satisfy citizens' needs, entrenched memories of that failure lead to skepticism and deepen the reliance on personalized, clientelistic relationships today.We account for both the demand side and the supply side of clientelism. Past experiences with public administrators create reputations that shape individual expectations about state capacity, constrain

Active political engagement, political patronage and local labour markets – The example of Shkoder

“…Clientelism is a contingent relationship between voters and politicians in which the latter “get things done” in exchange for the votes from the former. It is rooted in the level of state distrust, and the subject of this patron-client relationship is context-specific and may include direct cash payments, consumable goods, public sector jobs, court decisions and construction permits (Bustikova and Corduneanu-Huci, 2017). The development of clientelistic politics and political strategies to secure votes around election times, in particular, are shaped by the economic development (Hicken, 2011; Keefer and Vlaicu, 2008; Kitschelt and Kselman, 2013), democracy (institutional) quality (Keefer and Vlaicu, 2017), reputation (trust in the state) (Keefer and Vlaicu, 2008) and population size (Veenendaal and Corbett, 2020).…”

Institutions of Electoral Integrity and Clientelism: The Role of Electoral Management Bodies

“…For example, evidence from Ghana shows that clientelistic practices decrease over the experience of iterated elections (Lindberg 2010(Lindberg , 2013Lindberg 2011, 2013), as women's participation increases, and due to democratic education campaigns (Vicente and Wantchekon 2009). Parties and politicians may also decrease their clientelistic exchanges as their capacity for credible commitment increases, which is shown to be related the age of democracy (Keefer 2007;Keefer and Vlaicu 2008) 2 and voter trust in bureaucracies (Bustikova and Corduneanu-Huci 2017).…”

Religious Ideology and Clientelist Linkage in the Middle East and North Africa

“…The existing literature explains the variations in clientelism mainly from two theoretical perspectives: the state and party levels. State-level factors primarily emphasize the impacts of economic development, democratic experience, and election competitiveness on clientelism (Bustikova and Corduneanu-Huci 2011;Robinson and Verdier 2013;Keefer 2007;Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007;Schady 2000). Some scholars have examined the influence of various features of party organizations on clientelist linkages at the party level.…”