Pattern-based abstraction for verifying secrecy in protocols

Bozga, Liana; Lakhnech, Yassine; Périn, Michaël

doi:10.1007/s10009-005-0189-6

Cited by 12 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 38 publications

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“…This proves actually that the instanciation techniques in [19] are complete. This also provides completeness results for abstraction used in [6,23]. Of course, the verification problem will remain undecidable, because we cannot faithfully give a bound on the number of sessions.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 97%

“…Yet another solution is to consider an upper approximation of the set of execution sequences, in such a way that, when no attack is found on this upper approximation, then there is no attack on the protocol. This is typically the approach of [6,5].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Of course, the verification problem will remain undecidable, because we cannot faithfully give a bound on the number of sessions. Still, approximation techniques such as [5,6] can be simplified and when considering a bounded number of sessions we may assume w.l.o.g. that only these b agents are involved.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Security Properties: Two Agents Are Sufficient

Comon-Lundh¹,

Cortier²

2003

Programming Languages and Systems

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 97%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Security Properties: Two Agents Are Sufficient

Comon-Lundh¹,

Cortier²

2003

Programming Languages and Systems

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Integrating Automated and Interactive Protocol Verification

Brucker¹,

Mödersheim

2010

Formal Aspects in Security and Trust

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Abstract. A number of current automated protocol verification tools are based on abstract interpretation techniques and other over-approximations of the set of reachable states or traces. The protocol models that these tools employ are shaped by the needs of automated verification and require subtle assumptions. Also, a complex verification tool may suffer from implementation bugs so that in the worst case the tool could accept some incorrect protocols as being correct. These risks of errors are also present, but considerably smaller, when using an LCF-style theorem prover like Isabelle. The interactive security proof, however, requires a lot of expertise and time. We combine the advantages of both worlds by using the representation of the over-approximated search space computed by the automated tools as a "proof idea" in Isabelle. Thus, we devise proof tactics for Isabelle that generate the correctness proof of the protocol from the output of the automated tools. In the worst case, these tactics fail to construct a proof, namely when the representation of the search space is for some reason incorrect. However, when they succeed, the correctness only relies on the basic model and the Isabelle core.

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Security Protocol Verification: Symbolic and Computational Models

Blanchet

2012

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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Pattern-based abstraction for verifying secrecy in protocols

Cited by 12 publications

References 38 publications

Security Properties: Two Agents Are Sufficient

Security Properties: Two Agents Are Sufficient

Integrating Automated and Interactive Protocol Verification

Security Protocol Verification: Symbolic and Computational Models

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