Patterns of corruption and development in East Asia

Moran, Jon

doi:10.1080/01436599913695

Cited by 60 publications

(21 citation statements)

References 26 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…This shows that a worldwide cooperation network to combat corruption is in need. Olken (2005a, b) Subsidized rice Bureaucratic corruption Olken (2005a, b) Villages road projects Village-level corruption, kick-backs Japan Duggan and Levitt (2002) Sumo wrestling Collusion Malaysia Johnson and Mitton (2003) Capital control, government subsidy Cronyism, political connections Khan (1998) Patron-client networks Political corruption South Korea Moran (1999) Government-driven industrialization Politician-Chaebol link Khan (1998) Patron-client networks Political corruption Chang (2003) Chaebol's intergroup transactions Tunneling, Pyramid Bae, Kang, and Lim (2002) Mergers by business groups (chaebols) Tunneling Pakistan Khwaja and Mian (2005) Corporate lending Political rents The Philippines Moran (1999) Oligarchic dominance of state and business classes Political economy of corruption Singapore Quah (1989Quah ( , 1995Quah ( , 1999Quah ( , 2002 Public and private sectors Combating corruption Corruption, FDI inflows, and economic growth in Asia Country CPI a (1995 CPI change b (1995)(1996)(1997)(1998)(1999)(2000)(2001)(2002) FDI inflows c (1995)(1996)(1997)(1998)(1999)(2000)(2001)(2002)(2003)(2004) GDP growth d (1995)(1996)(1997)(1998)(1999)(2000)(2001)(2002)…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Corruption in Asia: Pervasiveness and arbitrariness

Lee

2007

Asia Pacific J Manage

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

How does one understand the differences and similarities of corruption among various Asian countries? We use a recent framework developed by Rodriguez, Uhlenbruck, and Eden ( 2005 ) to suggest that corruption has to be examined from two different dimensions: pervasiveness and arbitrariness. Using this framework, we ask why some Asian countries are able to achieve high levels of economic growth in the midst of high level corruption while other countries suffer from economic stagnation. We specifically suggest that more firms would bribe when pervasiveness is high, while fewer firms would bribe when arbitrariness is high. We also look into the implications on foreign direct investment. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2007Corruption, Pervasiveness, Arbitrariness,

show abstract

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Corruption in Asia: Pervasiveness and arbitrariness

Lee

2007

Asia Pacific J Manage

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…McCoy portrays the Lopezes' return as part of a post-1986 restoration of elite family power in a weak state ( [49], pp. 513-517; see also [29,52,75]). …”

Section: The Ferdinand and Imelda Showmentioning

confidence: 95%

“…Guaranteeing corrupt deals and in a setting of weak institutions is a chronic problem, however, and thus Presidents are handy friends to have. Violence is part of the story too ( [52], p. 582), particularly in remote areas. Oligarchs-and-clans corruption has done immense damage: powerful oligarchs and weak, faction-dominated official agencies inhibit grassroots democracy, a strong and independent civil society, and (until 1986 at least) credible elections.…”

Section: The Philippines: Oligarchs Clans and A Weak Statementioning

confidence: 96%

“…The nation is dominated by about eighty families ( [62], pp. 209-210; [67]; [52], p. 577; [68]); some are provincial dynasties, while others have risen to prominence through banking or industry [18,30,31,50]. Some oligarchs have turned segments of the state into fiefdoms; others have used corrupt influence to keep the state out of their business dealings.…”

Section: The Philippines: Oligarchs Clans and A Weak Statementioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Japan, Korea, the Philippines, China: four syndromes of corruption

Johnston

2008

Crime Law Soc Change

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Both generalizations about "Asian corruption", and claims about greater or lesser amounts of corruption, tend to overlook the many variations existing among and within Asian societies, and among the corruption problems they experience. I suggest that deeper influences in social, political and economic development, and contrasting institutional settings, create four distinctive syndromes of corruption, each with its own set of implications for relationships between wealth and power. Japan is an example of "influence markets" in which private interests buy or rent influence over relatively specific policy outcomes within a strong state. Korea is a case of "elite cartels", in which collusion and corrupt incentives enable several kinds of elites to cooperate in governing, enriching themselves, and resisting rising political competition. The Philippines is marked by "oligarchs and clans", with powerful families and their entourages plundering a weak state in a climate of uncertainty and insecurity. China experiences "official mogul" corruption, in which officials abuse state power with impunity, although that process is becoming increasingly fragmented. The four syndromes may help us understand why corruption and rapid growth have coexisted in some, but not all, Asian states for long periods of time, and may also help us understand why some of those states will adapt to new global realities only with some difficulty. They also show how "consensus"-driven reforms emanating from the west may not only be ineffective, but may actually make matters worse.

show abstract

“…For him, modernization and industrialization meant emulating Japan. Later his Yushin was very much modeled on the Meiji Restoration (1860) of Japan, and he openly expressed his admiration for the leaders of the Meiji Restoration (Moran, 1999).…”

Section: Corruption: Comparison and Contrast Between Bangladesh And Kmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Role of Government in Economic Development: A Comparative Study between Bangladesh and South Korea

Parnini

2011

jpag

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In East Asia the government of each country has played a decisive role in state development by engineering economic miracle. South Korea has dramatically been transforming its economy and managing development of the most important public and private enterprises since 1960s. South Korean government provided a favourable institutional framework by prioritizing industrial growth, within which the private sector could flourish. All these unique features are obviously the basis of Asian version of capitalism. The unique Asian variety of capitalism is mostly linked with the industrial policy debate where the government plays an active and paternal role in guiding the economy and society. This paper tries to explore the development strategies and economic policies adopted by the government of South Korea to ignite change in favour of radical economic transformation and its efficacious performance to create a sense of urgency to bring about a hospitable environment for growth and competitive advantage. Against this backdrop this paper also figures out the lessons to be learned by Bangladeshi Government from Korean experience to emulate and also to address the country's economic potentials in order to catch up the economy of the Asian Tigers.

show abstract

Patterns of corruption and development in East Asia

Cited by 60 publications

References 26 publications

Corruption in Asia: Pervasiveness and arbitrariness

Corruption in Asia: Pervasiveness and arbitrariness

Japan, Korea, the Philippines, China: four syndromes of corruption

The Role of Government in Economic Development: A Comparative Study between Bangladesh and South Korea

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About