Patterns of implicit and explicit attitudes in children and adults: Tests in the domain of religion.

Abstract

Among the most replicated results in social cognition is the split between explicit and implicit attitudes; adults demonstrate weaker group-based preferences on explicit rather than implicit measures. However, the developmental origins of this pattern remain unclear. If implicit attitudes develop over a protracted period of time, children should not demonstrate the implicit preferences observed among adults. Additionally, unlike adults, children may report group-based preferences due to their lesser concern with social desirability. In Study 1, Christian adults showed the expected pattern of robust implicit preference but no explicit preference. In four additional experiments, 6–8 year old children whose parents identified them as Christian viewed characters described as belonging to two starkly different religious groups (“strong religious difference”) or two relatively similar religious groups (“weak religious difference”). Participants then completed explicit and implicit (IAT) measures of attitude toward Christians and either Hindus (Study 2) or Jews (Studies 3–5). Three main results emerged. First, like adults, children showed significant implicit pro-Christian preferences across all studies. Second, unlike adults, children in the “strong religious difference” case reported preferences of approximately the same magnitude as their implicit attitudes (i.e., no dissociation). Third, even in the “weak religious difference” case, children showed implicit pro-Christian preferences (although, like adults, their explicit attitudes were not sensitive to intergroup difference). These data suggest that the seeds of implicit religious preferences are sown early and that children's explicit preferences are influenced by the social distance between groups.

Homophobic Attitudes and Associated Factors Among Adolescents: A Comparison of Six Latin American Countries

“…On the other hand, even though students were ensured that their responses were anonymous, risk of social desirability could not be discarded. In particular, some researchers have argued that attitudes should not be measured by directly asking for agreement with explicit statements, but in implicit ways such as measuring the reaction time to certain stereotypical associations (e.g., Greenwald & Banaji, 1995;Greenwald, McGhee & Schwartz, 1998;Heiphetz, Spelke & Banaji, 2013 …”

What do different beliefs tell us? An examination of factual, opinion-based, and religious beliefs

“…A recent set of experiments (Heiphetz, Spelke, Harris, & Banaji, 2013) investigated the extent to which American 5-10-year-olds and adults distinguish religious from factual and opinion-based beliefs. When told that two characters disagreed about a particular type of belief, participants of all ages were most likely to say that only one person could be right when responding to factual beliefs (e.g., about the size of germs) and least likely to provide this answer when responding to opinion-based beliefs (e.g., about the prettiest color).…”

“…Adults hold more positive attitudes toward religious in-group members than toward out-group members (Heiphetz, Spelke, & Banaji, 2013; Rowatt, Franklin, & Cotton, 2005) and especially negative attitudes toward atheists (Gervais, Shariff, & Norenzayan, 2011). Thus, adults may have judged that characters making religious claims with which they agreed more positively than characters making religious claims with which they disagreed.…”

In the name of God: How children and adults judge agents who act for religious versus secular reasons

“…The current work contributes to this literature by suggesting that, in childhood, intuitions may exert a stronger influence than testimony. Five- and six-year-olds responded identically to religiously motivated characters regardless of their own religious background, despite the fact that children of this age can articulate their own religious beliefs (Heiphetz, Spelke, Harris, et al, 2013), can distinguish between members of different religious groups (Heiphetz, Spelke, & Banaji, 2013), and receive different testimony regarding religious ideas. As individuals develop, they may begin to override these initial intuitions, making other factors (e.g., testimony, one's own perspectives) more powerful in adulthood than they were in childhood.…”

“…Secular Jewish five-year-olds in Israel drew inferences about others based on their religious affiliation (Diesendruck & haLevi, 2006), and American six-year-olds from a variety of religious backgrounds preferred individuals who shared their religious beliefs and identities (Heiphetz, Spelke, & Banaji, 2013, 2014). Unlike other social groups, such as race and caste, religious groups appear to insulate minority group members against in-group derogation.…”