2014
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2419016
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Pay Attention or Pay Extra: Evidence on the Compensation of Investors for the Implicit Credit Risk of Structured Products

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
2

Citation Types

0
3
0

Year Published

2016
2016
2018
2018

Publication Types

Select...
1
1
1

Relationship

0
3

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 3 publications
(3 citation statements)
references
References 53 publications
0
3
0
Order By: Relevance
“…(), Barberis and Shleifer (), Greenwood and Shleifer (), Barberis et al. (, ), Gennaioli, Ma, and Shleifer ()) and the neglect of risk (Gennaioli, Shleifer, and Vishny (), Coval, Pan, and Stafford (), Arnold, Schuette, and Wagner ()). Critically, under diagnostic expectations, departures from the rational benchmark are driven by updates in the probability of future events, and thus depend on the true distribution of states of nature.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…(), Barberis and Shleifer (), Greenwood and Shleifer (), Barberis et al. (, ), Gennaioli, Ma, and Shleifer ()) and the neglect of risk (Gennaioli, Shleifer, and Vishny (), Coval, Pan, and Stafford (), Arnold, Schuette, and Wagner ()). Critically, under diagnostic expectations, departures from the rational benchmark are driven by updates in the probability of future events, and thus depend on the true distribution of states of nature.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…It implies that in a boom investors are excessively optimistic and systematically become more pessimistic in the future, leading to a crisis even without deteriorating fundamentals. The model unifies the phenomena of extrapolation (Cagan 1956, Cutler et al 1990, DeLong et al 1990, Barberis and Shleifer 2003, Greenwood and Shleifer 2014, Barberis et al 2015a, b, Gennaioli, Ma, and Shleifer 2015 and the neglect of risk (Gennaioli, Shleifer, and Vishny 2012, Coval, Pan, and Stafford 2014, Arnold, Schuette, and Wagner 2015. Critically, households in our model are forward looking, and recognize policy shifts.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 91%
“…It implies that in a boom investors are excessively optimistic and systematically become more pessimistic in the future, leading to a crisis even without deteriorating fundamentals. The model unifies the phenomena of extrapolation (Cagan 1956, Cutler et al 1990, DeLong et al 1990, Barberis and Shleifer 2003, Greenwood and Shleifer 2014, Barberis et al 2015a, b, Gennaioli, Ma, and Shleifer 2015 and the neglect of risk (Gennaioli, Shleifer, and Vishny 2012, Coval, Pan, and Stafford 2014, Arnold, Schuette, and Wagner 2015. Critically, households in our model are forward looking, and recognize policy shifts.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 91%