Paying Hospital-Based Doctors: Fee for Whose Service?

Blomqvist, Åke; Busby, Colin

doi:10.2139/ssrn.2345417

Cited by 7 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 12 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Finally, the results stated in Proposition 4 are consistent with the findings of the previous studies that show the FFS scheme is effective in reducing the waiting time but not in improving the service quality. For example, Blomqvist and Busby (2013) show that the FFS scheme is effective in reducing the waiting time in Canada. Mot (2002) finds that in the Netherlands, the abolition of the FFS scheme has caused the waiting time to increase for elective surgery.…”

Section: Performance Comparisonmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Currently, the predominant scheme is called Fee-for-Service (FFS) under which an HCP receives payment each time a patient is admitted (or re-admitted). The FFS scheme creates incentives for HCPs to urge their doctors to rush through their appointments so as to treat more patients per day (Rabin 2014), even though it is known to be an effective scheme for reducing waiting time (Blomqvist and Busby 2013). Without resolving patients' problems completely, more revisits will ensue (van der Linden et al 2011).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

The Impact of Reimbursement Policy on Social Welfare, Revisit Rate, and Waiting Time in a Public Healthcare System: Fee-for-Service Versus Bundled Payment

Guo

Tang

Wang

et al. 2019

M&SOM

114

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper examines the impact of two reimbursement schemes, Fee-for-Service and Bundled Payment, on the social welfare, the patient revisit rate, and the patient waiting time in a public healthcare system. The two schemes differ on the payment mechanism: under the fee-for-service scheme, the healthcare provider receives the payment each time a patient visits (or revisits) whereas, under the bundled payment scheme, the healthcare provider receives a lump sum payment for the entire episode of care regardless of how many revisits a patient incurs. By considering the quality-speed tradeoff (i.e., a higher service speed reduces service quality, resulting in a higher revisit rate), we examine a three-stage Stackelberg game to determine the patients' initial visit rate, the service provider's service rate (which affects the revisit rate), and the funder's reimbursement rate. This analysis enables us to compare the equilibrium outcomes (social welfare, revisit rate and waiting time) associated with the two payment schemes. We find that when the patient pool size is large, the bundled payment scheme dominates the fee-for-service scheme in terms of higher social welfare and a lower revisit rate, whereas the fee-for-service scheme prevails in terms of shorter waiting time. When the patient pool is small, the bundle payment scheme dominates the fee-for-service scheme in all three performance measures.

show abstract

Section: Performance Comparisonmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%