2013
DOI: 10.1016/j.hjdsi.2013.04.012
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Paying physician group practices for quality: A statewide quasi-experiment

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Cited by 6 publications
(12 citation statements)
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References 26 publications
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“…16,18 Evidence of the effectiveness of marginal incentive payments for value is more mixed, however, and may depend on the size of the incentives. 25,26 Many payment reform efforts require significant changes in the care delivery and support systems, for instance, in the data-and claimsprocessing infrastructure, electronic health records (EHRs), and staff roles. But providers' limited ability to meet infrastructure demands for payment reform has made them resistant and hindered its implementation.…”
Section: Promise and Challenges Of Value-based Payment Reformmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…16,18 Evidence of the effectiveness of marginal incentive payments for value is more mixed, however, and may depend on the size of the incentives. 25,26 Many payment reform efforts require significant changes in the care delivery and support systems, for instance, in the data-and claimsprocessing infrastructure, electronic health records (EHRs), and staff roles. But providers' limited ability to meet infrastructure demands for payment reform has made them resistant and hindered its implementation.…”
Section: Promise and Challenges Of Value-based Payment Reformmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…7, [11][12][13]15,27,28 Some authors have recommended that incentives constitute at least 10 percent of compensation. Since Fairview's payment model allocated four times that level to quality incentives, we examined whether improvement was substantially larger than that observed in previous research or compared to other delivery systems in Minnesota.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The 12 papers were published between 2004–2017, seven were conducted in the United States of America [ 32 38 ], four in the UK [ 39 42 ] and one in Canada [ 43 ]. One study reported on an asthma-only scheme [ 36 ], three focused on diabetes-only schemes [ 32 , 33 , 43 ] and the remaining eight looked at diabetes within a multiple condition scheme [ 34 , 35 , 37 42 ].…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Beck’s [ 32 ] participants had volunteered to take part in the intensive case management programme and the control group were those who had chosen not to, creating a non-randomised, biased sample biased by willingness to participate. Conrad’s [ 34 ] participating group were selected by the Health Insurer, Fagan’s [ 35 ] participants were selected by the managed care organisation as they had a “leadership which was willing to champion the proposed quality improvement initiative” and Gulliford’s [ 39 ] participants were a self-selected group that agreed to participate in an evaluation of diabetes care. Due to the nature of financial incentive schemes, participant blinding is not an option so that allocation concealment was an important source of bias.…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%