PDKSAP : Perfected Double-Key Stealth Address Protocol without Temporary Key Leakage in Blockchain

BaseSAP: Modular Stealth Address Protocol for Programmable Blockchains

“…Feng et al [15] propose a SAP that does not require additional information to be published with every stealth address transaction, allowing such transactions to look like common blockchain transactions. The authors use the number of transactions between certain peers instead of generating a Diffie-Hellman secret for the stealth address generation process.…”

“…AbdulKader and Kumar [17] build on top of the protocol of [15] and use the transaction ID of the most recent P2P transaction between two entities instead of the number of transactions in the stealth address generation process. The authors argue that without the need to attach information to the stealth address transaction, related protocols become more censorship-resistant and lightweight.…”

“…Todd [2] 2014 ECDH One Yes Yes Monero [3] 2014 ECDH + DKSAP Two Yes Yes Courtois and Mercer [13] 2017 ECDH + DKSAP with multiple key pairs Multiple Yes Yes Fan [14] 2018 ECDH + DKSAP with improved parsing Two Yes Yes Fan et al [7] 2019 Bilinear Mapping One No N/A Liu et al [8] 2019 Lattice-based SAP Two No N/A Feng et al [15] 2020 ECDH + DKSAP with improved parsing Two No N/A Lee and Song [16] 2021 ECDH One Yes Yes Feng et al [5] 2021 Bilinear Mapping Two Yes Yes Mohideen and Kumar [17] 2022 ECDH + DKSAP with improved parsing Two No N/A…”

“…In Table I, we provide an overview of existing SAPs, focusing on two key aspects: the use of multiple keys (commonly known as scanning and spending keys) and the requirement to publish supplementary information with a stealth address transaction. Protocols such as [7], [15], and [17] don't require the publication of additional data, enabling enhanced privacy. These stealth address transactions blend seamlessly with regular transactions, making them indistinguishable.…”

Key derivable signature and its application in blockchain stealth address

“…Therefore, it is important for the SAP to have a well-defined approach to handling master key signatures and related security measures to ensure the continued safety and privacy of the system. In addition, the security model of PDPKS allows the adversary to corrupt the derived secret keys, which imposes a strong security requirement that is rarely targeted in subsequent stealth address protocols (Feng et al 2020;Yu 2020). There is still a lack of cryptographic formalization that should match the SAP usage in blockchain, and a security model capturing the basic security requirements of Monero-like SAPs and the stronger security proposed in PDPKS, respectively.…”