When governments offer concessions to an ideologically heterogeneous terrorist organization the moderates within that organization are most likely to accept the concessions. Consequently, the terrorist organization is left in the hands of extremists following concessions, leading to an increase in militantism and potentially in terrorist violence. However, governments often also require former terrorists to collaborate in counter-terrorism efforts, which improves the governments chances of eradicating terror entirely. I examine patterns of terrorist violence, government concessions, and counter-terrorism policy in five case studies: Basque separatists in Spain, Palestinian extremists, Irish Republican terrorists, Quebec separatists in Canada, and Zionist terrorists in British Mandate Palestine. The contribution of these case studies is twofold. First, they demonstrate that the proposed theoretical framework is an empirically useful conceptualization of the politics of terrorism. Second, and more importantly, I present a theoretically informed analysis of significant historical incidents of terrorism in an effort to shed light on the organizational and political dynamics underlying patterns of terrorist violence. This historical analysis demonstrates that, despite variance in government strategy, terrorist responses, and patterns of violence, all five case studies can be understood within a single theoretical framework.
A Comparative Study of Five CasesGovernments employ an array of strategies in their efforts to put an end to armed insurgency and terrorism. The twentieth century has witnessed government responses as varied as acquiescence, peace negotiations that include concessions to terrorists, and military crackdowns. Consider, for instance, the French withdrawal from Algeria, the Spanish granting of partial autonomy to Basque separatists, the Israeli negotiations with the Palestinians followed by a renewed focus on counter-terror, and the Russian refusal to negotiate with the Chechneyans coupled with a brutal military assault. This multiplicity of government reactions raises important questions for students of terrorism. Can granting concessions to terrorists resolve violent conflict? Why do governments simultaneously pursue both conciliatory and counter-insurgency strategies? What factors affect government and insurgent strategies and the level of political violence? These are the questions that motivate this study.I examine patterns of terrorist violence, government concessions, and counter-terrorism policy in five case studies: the Basque separatists in Spain, Palestinian extremists, the Irish Republican Army and its splinter groups, the Quebec separatists in Canada, and the Zionist terrorists in British Mandate Palestine. These case studies, as explained in greater detail later, are selected to probe theoretical claims deduced from a formal model of terrorist/government negotiations. In an earlier study I suggested a model that addresses how government concessions can cause terrorist organizati...