Peacekeeping Operations: Global Patterns of Intervention and Success, 1948-2004

Wallensteen, Peter; Heldt, Birger

doi:10.2139/ssrn.1899505

Cited by 27 publications

(34 citation statements)

References 60 publications

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“…86 an absolute standardized bias of less than 0.25 generally indicates balance in the covariate. in the unmatched sample, the absolute standardized bias between the treated and control groups is 83 see Heldt and wallensteen 2006. see also lebovic 2010.…”

Section: Quantitative Evidencementioning

confidence: 97%

Regional Organizations and International Politics: Japanese Influence over the Asian Development Bank and the UN Security Council

Lim

Vreeland²

2013

World Pol.

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Do regional hegemons use their power in regional organizations to advance foreign policy objectives? The authors investigate whether Japan leverages its privileged position at the Asian Development Bank (adb) to facilitate project loans for the elected Asian members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), a platform from which it seeks to shape global affairs. Analyzing panel data of adb loan disbursements to twenty-four developing member-countries from 1968 to 2009, the authors find that temporary UNSC membership increases adb loans, particularly during the post–1985 period, when Japan asserted greater influence in multilateral organizations. They estimate an average increase of over 30 percent. Because of Japan's checkered history of imperialism, the adb provides a convenient mechanism by which the government can obfuscate favors for politically important countries. Acting through this regional organization enables Japan to reconcile a low-key approach to foreign affairs with the contradictory goal of global activism–leading without appearing unilateralist.

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Section: Quantitative Evidencementioning

confidence: 97%

Regional Organizations and International Politics: Japanese Influence over the Asian Development Bank and the UN Security Council

Lim

Vreeland²

2013

World Pol.

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“…Over the last 30 years, peacekeeping has evolved from 'traditional' to 'new' peacekeeping (Ratner, 1995): peacekeepers are now more likely to be deployed to civil wars rather than interstate conflict, are more often authorized to use force, and tend to operate under broader and more demanding mandates (Heldt & Wallensteen, 2006). These developments have led not only to the deployment of a larger number of peacekeepers -from about 10,000 in 1985 to more than 100,000 in 2014 -but also to their deployment into more risky environments.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Standing alongside your friends

Ward

Dorussen

2016

Journal of Peace Research

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Why do countries contribute troops to UN peacekeeping? Recognizing the incentives to free ride on the contributions of other countries, existing explanations have tended to focus on the private benefits of providing troops. There has been particular emphasis on some major contributing countries that gain financially from providing peacekeepers. An alternative explanation could be that countries prefer to deploy troops to peacekeeping alongside countries with similar foreign policy preferences in order to maximize jointly produced private benefits. Accordingly, the willingness to provide peacekeepers should depend on which other countries are providing troops to peacekeeping operations. The implications are explored within the context of games on networks, and it is demonstrated that in equilibrium countries that are more Bonacich central in the network of foreign policy preference contribute disproportionally to UN peacekeeping. Based on actual contributions to UN peacekeeping from 1990 until 2011, we find that policy complementarities explain why countries provide a larger proportion of peacekeepers to a particular mission. Importantly, centrality in the network of policy complementarities matters and not simply that countries have moderate policy preferences. There is robust evidence for the prevalence of peacekeeping alongside your 'friends'; in effect, countries with a lot of 'friends' contribute more peacekeepers.

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“…The dataset used for the purpose of this project is based on three main sources: UCDP Battle-Related Deaths Dataset v.5-2010 (for the selection of conflicts), Graham (for the selection of peace enforcement operations), 49 and Heldt and Wallensteen (for the selection of other types of peace operations). 50 This means that only missions that have actually fulfilled -and not only proclaimed -the goals of "peacekeeping" (as defined by Heldt and Wallensteen) 51 or peace enforcement are included in the dataset. The data cover the period from 1990 till 2004.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Heldt and Wallensteen even theorize that "regional actors initially attempt to manage conflicts, and when they fail the conflicts are referred to the UN". 39 Nevertheless, it is important to emphasise that although the past two decades have experienced growing regional integration, this trend is not reflected in all parts of the world. Regional integration is a geographically uneven process and consequently, some parts of the world might be a priori denied the opportunity of a regional conflict management.…”

Section: How Does Regionalization Affect the Allocation Of Peace Opermentioning

confidence: 99%