Peak-Load Pricing of a Transportation Route with an Unpriced Substitute

Braid, Ralph M.

doi:10.1006/juec.1996.0028

Cited by 131 publications

(60 citation statements)

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“…For example, Verhoef, Nijkamp and Rietveld (1996) considered various ownership regimes, including private monopoly. Braid (1996) considered the problem in the context of Vickrey's (1969) bottleneck model. Liu and McDonald (1998) considered an empirical application, namely the Californian SR-91.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Pricing, Capacity and Long-Run Cost Functions for First-Best and Second-Best Network Problems

Verhoef

Koh²,

Shepherd

2008

SSRN Journal

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Pricing, Capacity and Long-Run Cost Functions for First-Best and Second-Best Network Problems

Verhoef

Koh²,

Shepherd

2008

SSRN Journal

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“…In transportation economics studies, the problem of road pricing traditionally has been set up for simplicity, with route choice and origin-destination travel frequency choice being the only two demand dimensions. Recently, several studies also consider departure time choice, employing Vichrey's (1969) bottleneck model (Bernstein and Muller 1993, Braid 1996, Liu and McDonald 1999, de Palma and Lindsey 2000. Verhoef and Rouwendal (2004) developed an analytical model with vehicle ownership as one of the endogenous variables.…”

Section: General Modeling Methods For Transportation Economic Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

No More Freeways: Urban Land Use-Transportation Dynamics without Freeway Capacity Expansion

Zhang

Xu²

2011

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“…In other words: the fine toll may in fact be a reward for some drivers, or even for all. Braid (1996) observes that it is in fact second-best optimal for a time-varying toll to start and end as a net subsidy at a bottleneck with an…”

Section: The Basic Bottleneck Model and Some Variants On Fine Tollingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Give or Take? Rewards vs. Charges for a Congested Bottleneck

Rouwendal

Verhoef

Knockaert³

2010

SSRN Journal

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This paper analyzes the possibilities to relieve congestion using rewards instead of taxes, as well as combinations of rewards and taxes. The model considers a Vickrey-ADL model of bottleneck congestion with endogenous scheduling. With inelastic demand, a fine (time-varying) reward is equivalent to a fine toll, and to a continuum of combinations of time-varying tolls and rewards (including fine feebates).When demand is price sensitive, a reward becomes less attractive from the efficiency viewpoint, because it attracts additional users to the congested bottleneck. As a result, both the second-best optimal rate of participation in the scheme, and the relative efficiency that can be achieved with it, decreases when demand becomes more elastic. Our analytical and simulation results for coarse schemes suggest that a coarse reward is less effective than a coarse feebate, which is itself less effective than a coarse toll. The most efficient coarse system is the step toll, which is also allowed to be positive in the shoulder period.

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Peak-Load Pricing of a Transportation Route with an Unpriced Substitute

Cited by 131 publications

References 0 publications

Pricing, Capacity and Long-Run Cost Functions for First-Best and Second-Best Network Problems

Pricing, Capacity and Long-Run Cost Functions for First-Best and Second-Best Network Problems

No More Freeways: Urban Land Use-Transportation Dynamics without Freeway Capacity Expansion

Give or Take? Rewards vs. Charges for a Congested Bottleneck

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