Peer-to-peer electricity market analysis: From variational to Generalized Nash Equilibrium

Abstract

We consider a network of prosumers involved in peer-to-peer energy exchanges, with differentiation price preferences on the trades with their neighbors, and we analyze two market designs: (i) a centralized market, used as a benchmark, where a global market operator optimizes the flows (trades) between the nodes, local demand and flexibility activation to maximize the system overall social welfare; (ii) a distributed peer-to-peer market design where prosumers in local energy communities optimize selfishly their trades, demand, and flexibility activation.We first characterize the solution of the peer-to-peer market as a Variational Equilibrium and prove that the set of Variational Equilibria coincides with the set of social welfare optimal solutions of market design (i). We give several results that help understanding the structure of the trades at an equilibrium or at the optimum. We characterize the impact of preferences on the network line congestion and renewable energy waste under both designs. We provide a reduced example for which we give the set of all possible generalized equilibria, which enables to give an approximation of the price of anarchy. We provide a more realistic example which relies on the IEEE 14-bus network, for which we can simulate the trades under different preference prices. Our analysis shows in particular that the preferences have a large impact on the structure of the trades, but that one equilibrium (variational) is optimal.

A coalition formation game framework for peer-to-peer energy trading

“…where β > 0. The relationship in (17) is motivated by the fact that a prosumer needs to pay the government tax and a subscription fee, captured via β, for using the transmission line provide by the grid for P2P purpose. Now, the flow of energy for charging and discharging batteries via P2P establishes that the total energy charged by the receivers batteries should be equal to the total energy discharged by the providers in V, i.e., E d (t) = E c (t).…”

“…Trading mechanisms that focus on empowering prosumers in the market are proposed in [11] and [12]. In the literature, integration of P2P trading in the energy market is also discussed via double-auction based [13], fairness based [14], consensus-based [15], negotiation-based [16], generalized Nash equilibrium [17], and orchestrator based [18] approaches respectively.…”

A New Vision on the Prosumers Energy Surplus Trading Considering Smart Peer-to-Peer Contracts

“…Another category of the published papers regards the transactions of the PEST in the context of transactive energy in µGs [30][31][32]. The authors in [33] the transactions consider different preference of prices.…”

“…In addition, the consumer-driven scenario is S5-minimum price for consumers. It should be mentioned that many papers are the same with the References [7,[11][12][13][14][15][16][17][18][20][21][22][23][25][26][27][28][29][30][31][32][33] presented in Table 1. Table 1.…”

“…A comparative state of the art between our method and the literature. [7,17] no no no no yes yes [11,12,25] yes no no no no yes [13] no no yes yes no yes [14,15] no no yes yes yes yes [16,23] yes no no yes no yes [18] no no yes no no no [20,26] no no yes no no yes [21,22,30] no no no no yes no [27] no no no yes yes no [28] no no yes no yes yes [29] no yes no no no yes [31] no yes no yes no no [32,33] no no no no yes yes Proposed approach yes yes yes yes yes yes A previous work of the authors, in [34], proposes only at principle level a particular approach for prosumers energy trading in µGs as an efficient P2P exchange based on the blockchain technology. Specifically, the algorithm solves a mathematical model for the latest challenges regarding both the ADN and the newest type of electricity market participants (prosumers) using virtual or crypto price as the transaction currency.…”