Peirce’s Rhetorical Turn: Conceptualizing education as semiosis

Indexical Ways of Knowing: An Inquiry Into the Indexical Sign and How to Educate for Novelty

“…While admittedly in recent edusemiotic literature there has been disagreement about exactly how to treat the category of firstness 14 we can see consensus emerge around the connectedness of firstness to aesthetic experience; a connection, it should be noted, that Peirce stressed throughout his career. 15 Similarly, we can see such congruencies emerge in recent edusemiotic and developmental treatments of secondness; where despite important theoretical distinctions there is notably more agreement than disagreement about what indexicality represents for learning; mainly the recognition that secondness and indexicality offer us insights into a not yet actualized "pedagogy of surprise" (Strand, 2013, p. 801) that places lived experience in a central role (Strand, 2013;McCarthey, 2010;Noth, 2010, p. 2-3;West, 2015). Notably, Colapietro (2013) recognizes the role of secondness and experiential learning through the Peircean notion of contrite fallibilism, quite synonymous with the Piagetian developmental recognition that learning occurs through dis-adaptation.…”

“…It is important to emphasize that Peirce himself was experimenting with his ideas of the categories of firstness, secondness and thirdness throughout his career. In this study, I am most focusing on Peirce's later period of thought-what Torill Strand (2013) aptly calls his rhetorical turn-where, after abandoning the impossible project of a complete typology of sign types, Peirce turned his focus away from signs as such, towards the action between signs, or semiosis (Peirce first introduced this concept in his Johns Hopkins Logic Seminar of 1883). Semiosis, as many scholars have shown, is the object of Peircean edusemiotic (for more on conceptualizing semiosis as learning, see Cunningham, 1987;Strand, 2013;Semetsky, 2007, p. 209;Noth, 2010).…”

“…In this study, I am most focusing on Peirce's later period of thought-what Torill Strand (2013) aptly calls his rhetorical turn-where, after abandoning the impossible project of a complete typology of sign types, Peirce turned his focus away from signs as such, towards the action between signs, or semiosis (Peirce first introduced this concept in his Johns Hopkins Logic Seminar of 1883). Semiosis, as many scholars have shown, is the object of Peircean edusemiotic (for more on conceptualizing semiosis as learning, see Cunningham, 1987;Strand, 2013;Semetsky, 2007, p. 209;Noth, 2010). Such a focus on semiosis recognizes that knowledge is "a process, not a static structure to be learned and remembered" (Cunningham, 1987, p. 214).…”

Transition, Action and Education: Redirecting Pragmatist Philosophy of Education

“…Dewey continues to retain a considerable influence on the sub‐field of philosophy for children, mostly because of the concern for community and democracy in the development of shared sustained thinking (Johannson, ). Exceptions to the concern with Dewey include the influence of Peirce, especially on edusemiotics (Olteanu, ; Pesce, ; Semetsky, ; Stables, ; Strand, ; also Strand, , Thayer‐Bacon, ), and work in which Saito and Standish have consistently invited consideration of Emerson, Putnam and Cavell (Cavell and Standish, ; Saito and Standish, ) . In much of this work, James has been neglected, and needlessly so.…”

Community of Inquiry and Inquiry-Based Learning

“…Three special issues are dedicated to Peirce from the point of view of educational philosophy (see Semetsky, 2005;Colapietro et al, 2005;Strand, 2013). Peirce "posited logic as a theory of dynamic inquiry irreducible to some indubitable and certain knowledge" (Semetsky, 2005, 153).…”