Penalty Kicks in Soccer

Abstract

This paper uses the model proposed by Chiappori, Levitt and Groseclose (2002) to test for mixed-strategy Nash equilibria in a game between a kicker and a goalkeeper, in a situation of a soccer penalty kick. The main contribution of this paper is to develop an alternative testing methodology, based on the use of a simultaneous-equation regression approach that directly tests the equilibrium conditions. Using the same data than Chiappori, Levitt and Groseclose we find similar results than them, and we are also able to separately analyze the behavior of different types of players (classified according to the foot that they use to kick the ball, and to the strategies that they choose to mix).JEL Classification: C72 (non-cooperative games), L83 (sports), C35 (simultaneousequation discrete-regression models). ResumenEste artículo utiliza el modelo propuesto por Chiappori, Levitt y Groseclose (2002) para testear equilibrios de Nash en estrategias mixtas en un juego entre un pateador y un arquero, en una situación de tiro penal en el fútbol. La mayor contribución del trabajo es que desarrolla una metodología alternativa, basada en el uso de un enfoque de regresión con ecuaciones simultáneas que testea directamente las condiciones de equilibrio del juego. Usando los mismos datos que Chiappori, Levitt y Groseclose se hallan resultados similares, pudiendo también analizarse separadamente el comportamiento de distintos tipos de jugadores (clasificados según el pie que usen para patear la pelota, y las estrategias que elijan mezclar).Clasificación del JEL: C72 (juegos no cooperativos), L83 (deportes), C35 (modelos de regresión de ecuaciones simultáneas con variables discretas).Descriptores: tiros penales en fútbol, estrategias mixtas, equilibrio de Nash, regresión de ecuaciones simultáneas, test de Wald.

Goal-Side Selection in Soccer Penalty Kicking When Viewing Natural Scenes

“…In any case, such a bias on goal-side selection has not been examined systematically for the penalty situation in competitive soccer. What has been reported, however, is that right-footed kickers score more often on the left goal-side (from their perspective), while left-footed kickers are more successful on the right side (Coloma, 2007 ). But this was not based on a more general kicking bias to one goal-side.…”

Kick it like Ballack: The effects of goalkeeping gestures on goal-side selection in experienced soccer players and soccer novices

“…Surprisingly, and to the best of our knowledge, nothing is known about whether such a bias of kicking direction can be observed in competitive soccer. What has been reported, however, is that penalty takers are more successful when they direct their kicks to the opposite goal side (Coloma, 2007). But it is not known how many kicks are directed to the left or right side of the goal (especially, with regard to footedness) and whether there is a general goal-side selection bias in competitive soccer.…”

A game theory‐based approach for the study of inter‐interference in coexisting wireless body area networks

“…The Nash equilibrium of the game is demonstrated to be genuine and distinct, and a method based on the best response is advised to identified. [13][14][15] Fading can result in a multitude of errors due to irregular human movement and the dispersion of WBAN sensors; these errors can be identified by tracking the bit error rate (BER). More electricity must be used in order to get a higher BER.…”

“…A power control algorithm‐based internetwork interference reduction technique is suggested by Du et al 12 A noncooperative game that considers both WBAN energy efficiency and internetwork interference is used to emulate power regulation. The Nash equilibrium of the game is demonstrated to be genuine and distinct, and a method based on the best response is advised to identified 13–15 …”