Pengaruh Stuktur Kepemilikan Dan Dewan Komisaris Independen Terhadap Nilai Perusahaan Dengan Manajemen Laba Dan Kebijakan Hutang Sebagai Variabel Intervening

Abstract

<p class="Style17">The objective of this research are to identi6 'the direct and indirect influences of corporate gover­nancesbucture such as, board of independent commissioner, institutional ownershi :rand manajerial ownership to the fimes value and earnings management debt as intervening variable.</p><p class="Style17">This research examine 37 manufacturing companies fisted in Jakarta Stock Exchange and issues waled financial statement since 2002-2004. The statistical methods used to test the hypothesis is Structural Equation Model (SEM). The empirical result of this research indicates that manajerial ownership has a positif significant and board of commissionerhas a negative significant influences to earnings management whereas institutional ownership have no influence to earnings manage­ment. The following test indicates that board of commissioner and manajerial ownership and institutional ownership have no significant influence to the firm's value. The control variable, firm's size, has a positive significant influence to earnings management whereas leverage has a negative significant influence to the firm's value. The Last test indicates that earnings management and debt have influence to the firm's value, so it can be concluded that earnings management and debt is an intervening variable.</p><p class="Style1"><strong><em>Keywords: </em></strong><strong><em>corporate governance, earnings management, debt, firm's value, board of director, </em></strong><strong><em>manajerial ownership, institutional</em></strong></p>

The Role of CSR to Influence the Relationship between Institutional Ownership and Managerial Ownership on Firm Value

“…Muryati & Suardikha (2014), as well as Sholekah & Venusita (2014), found that managerial ownership significant positive effect on firm value. However, results of the study by Suastini et al, (2016) and Nasser (2008) show that managerial ownership has a negative and significant effect on firm value. Although managerial ownership has risen, but due to managerial ownership in manufacturing companies from 2010-2013 the company's value does not rise at less than a hundred percent, i.e.…”

“…results .from. Warapsari & Suaryana (2016) and Nasser (2008), however, found that institutional ownership had a negative effect on firm value. This shows that institutional ownership is dominated by parties that are not independent (affiliated with each other) so that the function of institutional ownership as a supervisor for management cannot run properly even though the ownership of shares by institutional parties is high.…”

Faktor-Faktor Yang Mempengaruhi Manajemen Laba Perusahaan Publik Di Indonesia Pada Tahun 2008

“…Model Jones yang dimodifikasi (Dechow,1995). Model ini digunakan dalam penelitian-penelitan manajemen laba sebelumnya seperti oleh Nasser (2008), Yang Et.al (2007 dan Myers& Skinner (2000). Dalam penelitian Smith (1976), Dhaliwal et al (1982, Morck et al (1988), Gabrielsen et al (2003), Nasser (2008) menemukan adanya pengaruh kepemilikan manajerial terhadap manajemen laba.…”

“…Model ini digunakan dalam penelitian-penelitan manajemen laba sebelumnya seperti oleh Nasser (2008), Yang Et.al (2007 dan Myers& Skinner (2000). Dalam penelitian Smith (1976), Dhaliwal et al (1982, Morck et al (1988), Gabrielsen et al (2003), Nasser (2008) menemukan adanya pengaruh kepemilikan manajerial terhadap manajemen laba. Mitra (2002), Koh (2003) dan Midiastuty & Machfoedz (2003) menunjukkan kepemilikan manajerial berpengaruh secara negatif Sedangkan hasil Werfield et al (1995), Wedari (2004), Setyo (2005) dan menemukan adanya pengaruh secara positif.…”

PENGARUH STRUKTUR KEPEMILIKAN SAHAM, KEBIJAKAN DIVIDEN DAN KEBIJAKAN HUTANG TERHADAP NILAI PERUSAHAAN (Studi Pada Perusahaan Yang Terdaftar di BEI)

“…Masalah keagenan tentunya akan menimbulkan kerugian. Karena konflik kepentingan antara agen dan pemilik ini dapat menimbulkan biaya yang di sebut dengan biaya keagenan (IndraSurya dan Ivan Yustiavandana, 2008).Jensen danMeckling (1976) dalam Etty M Nasser (2008). menyatakan ada tiga biaya keagenan, antara lain: pertama, monitoring cost (biaya monitoring), yaitu biaya untuk membatasi aktivitas yang dilakukan agen.…”