2009
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1992445
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Pension Privatization and Country Risk

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Cited by 3 publications
(3 citation statements)
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“…The results of savings regressions are in line with Schwarz and Arias's (2014) suggestions that debt-financed transition is unlikely to increase savings. Regarding possible detrimental growth effects, we note the possibility of deteriorating investor confidence, since explicit public debt is treated less favorably than the implicit pension debt (Cuevas et al, 2008). Overall, we can conclude that the lack of political support for the strict and long-lasting austerity measures required to preclude the emergence of disguised-PAYG financing severely undermines the feasibility of carve-out pension privatization.…”
Section: Implications For Policymakingmentioning
confidence: 87%
“…The results of savings regressions are in line with Schwarz and Arias's (2014) suggestions that debt-financed transition is unlikely to increase savings. Regarding possible detrimental growth effects, we note the possibility of deteriorating investor confidence, since explicit public debt is treated less favorably than the implicit pension debt (Cuevas et al, 2008). Overall, we can conclude that the lack of political support for the strict and long-lasting austerity measures required to preclude the emergence of disguised-PAYG financing severely undermines the feasibility of carve-out pension privatization.…”
Section: Implications For Policymakingmentioning
confidence: 87%
“…Besides fiscal distress, the asymmetrical treatment of implicit pension debt and explicit public debt within the EU Stability and Growth Pact has been suggested as another driver of reform reversals (Casey, 2014;Schwartz and Arias, 2014). It should be noted that the asymmetrical treatment is entirely justified, due to both theoretical (Franco, 1995) and practical (Cuevas et al, 2008) considerations that suggest implicit pension debt is more junior and more easily manageable than public debt. Nonetheless, in practice, EU fiscal regulations did provide some additional incentives for reform reversal.…”
Section: Eu Fiscal Rules and Causes Of Reform Reversalmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This said, the impact of the EU's fiscal framework on the reversal is difficult to disentangle from market pressures during crisis- Cuevas et al (2008) find that investors put a higher weight on explicit government debt than on implicit pension liabilities in their assessment of country creditworthiness.…”
Section:  Countries With the Largest Second Pillars-as Measured By T...mentioning
confidence: 99%